The Rise of Rail-Power in War and Conquest, 1833-1914Pratt, Edwin A.
History
The Rise of Rail-Power in War and Conquest, 1833-1914
Pratt, Edwin A.
Railroads; Transportation, Military
After the annexation of the Orange Free State railways, the Chief
of the Staff agreed that the railway staff officers in that State
should be under the orders of the Director of Railways through his
Deputy-Assistant-Directors; and a like course was adopted shortly
afterwards in respect to the railway staff officers in Cape Colony. In
this way an undivided chain of responsibility was secured, affording
a much greater guarantee of efficiency alike in control and in actual
operation.
Concerning the Deputy-Assistant-Directors, Sir Percy Girouard says
they were found to be of great benefit to the railway officials, who
appreciated their work and laboured in hearty co-operation with them;
though they experienced difficulty in establishing their position with
the Generals and Staff officers, to whom the arrangement was an entire
novelty, and one they did not at first understand.
In the first instance the principle of military control applied
specially to the lines in Cape Colony, those in Natal being still
operated by the Natal Government Railway Department, with certain
assistance in the matter of repairs; though after eighteen months of
war, the military transport system first established in Cape Colony
became uniform throughout British South Africa.
TRANSPORT CONDITIONS
The need for the elaborate organisation thus brought into existence was
all the greater because of the difficulties by which those responsible
for the conduct of military transport were faced.
In November, 1899, considerable portions of the lines both in Cape
Colony and in Natal were in the possession of the Boers, so that, beyond
a certain distance, the British would have to fight for every mile
of railway before they could make use of it. After, also, regaining
possession of the lines on British territory controlled by the Boers,
they would require first to capture and then to operate those on the
enemy's territory; and in each case they would have to be prepared to
repair the damage the enemy would be certain to do to the lines in order
to prevent their use by the advancing forces. Meanwhile the traffic
must be kept open, as far as possible, for the conveyance of troops and
stores to the theatre of war and for the carrying out of such strategic
movements as the requirements of the military situation might render
necessary, adequate protection of the lines being meanwhile assured.
There were, in fact, occasions when the whole issue of the campaign
seemed to turn upon the question as to whether or not the British could
either secure possession of the railways or, alternatively, repair them
as fast, more or less, as the enemy could demolish them.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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