The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 1 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far EastKuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
History
The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 1 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far East
Kuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905
CONTENTS TO VOL. I
CHAPTER I
PAGES
An historical résumé of the problems which confronted
the Russian War Department during the past two
centuries 1–39
CHAPTER II
Russia’s frontiers in Europe and Asia—Conclusions as
to their suitability to the needs of the Empire 40–77
CHAPTER III
The expansion in numbers of our army in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries, the suitability of our
peace and war establishments, and the growth of
our neighbours’ forces—The growing complication
of our defence problems towards the end of the
last century 78–95
CHAPTER IV
Deductions drawn from the work of the army in the
past 200 years, which may serve as some guide for
the line our military policy should take in the
beginning of the twentieth century 96–110
CHAPTER V
The work before the War Department in the concluding
years of the last, and the early years of the present,
century—Money allotted to it from 1898–1903—Inadequacy
of these sums to meet the demands—Measures
which it was possible to undertake—Steps
taken to improve and consolidate our position
in the Far East 111–144
CHAPTER VI
The War Minister’s opinion on the Manchurian and
Korean questions from the year 1900 to 1903—What
he did to avoid a rupture with Japan 145–198
CHAPTER VII
Why the Japanese were successful 199–228
CHAPTER VIII
Reasons for our reverses: The minor part played by the
fleet—The small carrying capacity of the Siberian
and Eastern Chinese Railways—Absence of any
diplomatic arrangements to permit of the unhampered
despatch and distribution of our forces—Delay
in mobilization of reinforcements—Disadvantages
of “partial mobilization”—Transfer
during the war of regulars from military districts
in European Russia into the reserve—Delay in
the arrival at the front of drafts—Weakening of
the disciplinary powers of commanders as to the
punishment awarded to private soldiers—Delay in
promoting those who distinguished themselves on
service—Technical shortcomings 229–309
ILLUSTRATIONS TO VOL. I
GENERAL KUROPATKIN _Frontispiece_
OPPOSITE PAGE
H.I.M. THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS II. 156
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