The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 1 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far East — John Shaqi
The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 1 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far EastKuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
History
The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 1 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far East
Kuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905
“... But for this course of action, breadth of view, daring,
capability, and energy were necessary—qualities which the new
Emperor did not possess. It would even have been sufficient if he
had had round him advisers who would have lent him some support,
but there was not a man of any moral or intellectual strength in
his entourage. He was surrounded by those who, haunted by the
groundless fear of having to fight the whole of Europe, had been
partly responsible for Nicholas’s retreat. The only voices to be
heard now were those that cried: ‘Peace! peace at any price!’ And
so, after the fall of Sevastopol, peace was concluded at a moment
when that place might have played the same rôle as Moscow did in
1812. After the sacrifice of the fortress we should have announced
that, far from being over, operations were only just beginning!
With the Allies would have then remained the onus of finishing the
war.”
Dissatisfaction with the results of the campaign was universal, and
penetrated all grades of society. The root of the evil was seen to lie
in our serfdom, so the Tsar Alexander II., the most humane of men,
himself headed a movement for the emancipation of the serfs. They
received their freedom. This event was of extraordinary importance,
constituting, in truth, an epoch in Russian life, which affected all
spheres of activity, not excluding that of the War Department. A new
language was heard on all sides. Indeed, it is difficult now to realize
the animated, convincing, and liberal tone of the articles which
appeared in the _Voenni Sbornik_. But, alas! everything soon returned
to its former state. The Polish rebellion of 1863, the attempt to
assassinate the Tsar, and the open conspiracies of a few evil-minded
people, served as a pretext for the adherents of the old régime to
strive for the reduction of the rights that had been granted. Their
efforts were crowned with success, and a reaction set in which was
particularly violent as regards educational and agrarian affairs. The
War Department, however, was under the enlightened guidance of General
Milutin, who, as far as possible, reduced the effect of this reaction
upon the army; the department, indeed, was on this account for some
time looked upon with suspicion. Though the Crimean War did arouse to
some extent the latent patriotism of the masses, it was waged at too
great a distance from the heart of the people to have earned the title
of a national struggle.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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