The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 1 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far EastKuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
History
The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 1 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far East
Kuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905
It is unthinkable that any great nation could ever have become
reconciled to the terms of such a peace as that signed by Russia in
1856, when she engaged to abstain from maintaining a fleet in the Black
Sea, and to give up the mouths of the Danube, won by her in 1828–29.
However involved, therefore, its causes may appear, the war of 1877–78
was in reality but a continuation of our two-hundred-year-old struggle
towards the Black Sea, on this occasion complicated by the necessity
of assisting our kindred in the Balkans—the Servians and Bulgarians.
Though we did not make the most of our opportunities, the time for
preparation allowed us by the Turko-Servian War really decided the
issue of that between ourselves and Turkey. It is true we mobilized
and concentrated the army in Bessarabia before the declaration of war,
but we delayed so long in making this declaration that the Turks also
had time for preparation. The severe reverses we suffered after our
initial successes showed that our opponents, who were now armed with
the breech-loading rifle and organized on the European model, were no
longer the foe that we had faced in 1828, whose mobs of armed men were
easily routed by small bodies of our troops. As usual, we put too few
men in the field at first; but the Emperor, upon the advice of General
Milutin, pressed masses of reinforcements to the front, among them the
Guards and the Grenadiers, the flower of our army. Our comparatively
short line of communication enabled this to be done with considerable
rapidity. It was at Plevna, in August, 1877, that we suffered our last
heavy reverse, and by October the Guards and Grenadiers had arrived at
the front. Including the Roumanian, Servian, Montenegrin, and Bulgarian
militias, we succeeded in placing superior numbers in the field, our
armies amounting altogether to some 850,000 men in both theatres of
operations, and in spite of the enemy’s gallant opposition, we advanced
up to the very walls of their capital. But it was not a lightly-won
victory. To break down the stubborn defence of the Turks, who were ably
commanded at Plevna, we were forced to put thrice their number into the
field. Dubniak Hill, which was very weakly fortified, was only taken by
the Guards, who were five or six times as strong as the enemy at that
particular point, after a desperate fight. Though their earth-works
were mostly of field profile, and without any obstacles, such as wire
entanglement, mines, and abatis; though the defenders had no bomb-proof
shelters; and though we were three to one in men, and put many more
guns in action, we were unable to seize Plevna by assault, but had
to resort to a blockade. Our Commander-in-Chief, however, was ably
supported on the European side by such distinguished leaders as Gurko,
Skobeleff, Radetski, and Todleben, whose troops soon became seasoned,
and brought victory to our arms. In the theatre of operations in Asia
the Grand-Duke Michael Nicolaeff was assisted by Lazareff, Heyman,
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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