The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 1 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far EastKuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
History
The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 1 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far East
Kuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905
[9] On the north-west, from Varanger Fiord to Pskoff (about 1,350
miles), we marched with our powerful neighbour Sweden, who possessed
an army of 100,000 men. At this disturbed period she was mistress of
the country round the Baltic coasts and of the present province of
St. Petersburg, and possessed in the fortresses of Finland and in the
Baltic littoral an enveloping base for a gradual movement on our Pskoff
and Novgorod provinces. On the west, from Pskoff to Tchigrin (about
1,000 miles), we marched with Poland, the frontier re-entering like a
wedge near Smolensk to a distance of 300 miles from Moscow. Poland,
the ally of Sweden and Turkey, was Russia’s natural enemy, for she was
in occupation of our soil in White and Little Russia. On the south,
from Tchigrin to Azov (about 400 miles), the boundary ran practically
undefined, shared with the Tartar hordes subject to Turkey, who then
possessed an army of some 500,000 men, and a strong fleet on the
Black Sea. From Azov to the Caspian (about 400 miles) our neighbours
were Tartars and nomadic Caucasian mountaineers, who were continually
raiding our borders. Lastly, in Asia our frontier, which was here also
only vaguely defined, marched with that of the Kirghiz tribes and races
subordinate to China.
[10] [In 1792.—ED.]
[11] In the year 1800 the weakest portions of our frontiers, which had
increased since 1700 to a total length of 11,333 miles, were: On the
side of Finland (Swedish), from Neyshlot to the mouth of the Kumen
(about 200 miles), owing to the proximity of this boundary to St.
Petersburg; from Grodno to Khotin (about 130 miles), due to the absence
of natural obstacles and strong fortresses, and to the propinquity of
Prussia and Austria; on the Caucasian side only a portion lay within
our sphere of influence, and after the annexation of Georgia conflicts
became frequent with the Caucasians; on the Central Asian side, because
the annexation of the Kirghiz tribes, in the time of Anne Ivanovna,
had brought Russia into immediate contact with the Khanates of Khiva,
Bokhara, and Khokand, whose inhabitants looked upon our approach with
no friendly eye.
[12] The troops of Suvoroff, Rimskov-Korsakoff, Herman, and those
afloat in the fleet of Admiral Ushakoff.
[13] The armies of Lassa (about 65,000; headquarters, Grodno) and of
Gudovitch (about 65,000 to 70,000; headquarters, Kamenetz-Podolsk).
[14] “Memoirs of a Sevastopol Man” (N. S. Maloshevitch, 1904), chaps.
ix., x.
[15] In this fight our weapons had a range of 300 to 450 yards, as
compared with the enemy’s (Minié) rifle, which had a range of 1,200
yards. Our Rifle battalions, of which we had one per army corps, were
alone armed with rifles.
[16] [? Tchernaya.—ED.]
[17] Only fourteen men were left of the company in whose advanced
trench the standard was. The officer commanding the battalion, the
company commander, and company subaltern, were all killed.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account