The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 1 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far EastKuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
History
The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 1 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far East
Kuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905
[18] [An affair of outposts on the Afghan frontier, which caused a
considerable stir at the time.—ED.]
[19] [In the eighteenth century, 1,500,000; in the nineteenth century,
1,700,000.—ED.]
[20] [This is apparently extracted from General Kuropatkin’s report of
1900.—ED.]
CHAPTER II
Russia’s frontiers in Europe and Asia—Conclusions as to their
suitability to the needs of the Empire.
The second chapter of a report, made in 1900, when I was Minister for
War, contained a strategical review of our frontiers. The general
conclusions arrived at may be summarized as follows:
1. _Swedish Frontier._[21]—This is 1,000 miles long, and traverses a
rugged, inaccessible, and sparsely populated country. Starting from
the extreme northern point of the Gulf of Bothnia, and running due
north, it acts as a sharply defined ethnographical line between the
Scandinavians on the west and the Finns on the east. The southern
portion quite corresponds to our requirements, but the northern is
too artificially drawn, and is disadvantageous to us, as it cuts
Finland off from the Arctic Ocean, and gives all the coast to Norway.
We would naturally like to see a realignment of this portion, but
the advantages to be gained are too insignificant to warrant our
quarrelling about them. Still, the situation on this section of our
border cannot be considered to be all that is to be desired.
It has been shown in the preceding chapter what efforts and sacrifices
have been made by Russia in order to gain access to the Baltic Sea
and the Gulfs of Finland and Bothnia. We had to fight four wars with
Sweden, and put 1,800,000 men into the field, and only won at last
after losing some 130,000 men in killed and wounded. The main factor in
our success was the influence on events exercised by Peter the Great,
for it was his victory at Poltava which opened the way for us. At the
beginning of the eighteenth century the Viborg province was, to a
certain extent, Russianized: Russian villages and churches were to be
found in it, and our language was the predominant tongue. In 1809, by
the peaceful Treaty of Friederichsham, Finland passed for ever into the
Empire. All that then remained to be done was to take advantage of our
victories, and quietly but firmly incorporate the conquered province
with the rest of Russia. But we did not do this. Being fully occupied
elsewhere—in fortifying our foothold on the Black and Caspian Seas, in
advancing towards the Pacific, in a long struggle in the Caucasus,
in wars with Poland and in Central Asia—we paid little attention to
what was going on in Finland, and rested content with the outward
peacefulness, order, and submission of its people. The Finns took
advantage of this, and from 1810 to 1890 unceasingly worked against
us, hoping always to succeed in obtaining complete autonomy. In 1811
the Viborg province, won by us at so great a cost, was again made over
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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