The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 1 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far EastKuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
History
The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 1 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far East
Kuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905
to them, though they have not to this day completely obliterated in it
all traces of Russian citizenship. Then, with the assistance of certain
of our statesmen, we learned by degrees to forget that Finland had
ever really been an integral portion of our Empire; we were gradually
taught to feel that she ought to be administered according to the
Swedish Constitution of 1772, and, finally, that she was not really a
Russian province, but an autonomous State. In 1880 the law of universal
military service was enacted. This gave Finland a national army—not a
large one, it is true, but one which, by a well-thought-out system of
reserves, enabled her to put in the field an armed force of 100,000 men
near the Russian capital. Thus the Finns, without shedding a drop of
blood, but by working cautiously, continuously, and systematically for
eighty years, have succeeded in again shutting us out from the Gulfs
of Finland and Bothnia, and have, to a great extent, robbed us of the
fruits of our victories. Therefore, as the kingdom[22] of Norway and
Sweden is weak, and as Finland, which stretches almost to the walls of
the Russian capital, and screens not only it, but the whole of Northern
Russia, is of immense importance to us, we ought, instead of planning
any rectification of the Swedish frontier, to think how best to remove
the causes of friction between the two countries. Sweden could only
hope to take Finland from us if the Finns’ dream of independence came
true; she could only risk operations against us in that country if the
inhabitants joined her or were at least sympathetic. Consequently, to
insure our safety on that frontier, it is our duty to smooth the way as
much as possible for the early unification of Finland and Russia.
The following is a quotation from my report:
“However just our claims to the possession of Finland may be, it
must be acknowledged that our mistaken policy with regard to her,
lasting for eighty years, cannot be rectified all at once. Hasty
action in dealing with matters which touch the domestic life of a
people can only irritate and intensify difficulties. A firm and,
at the same time, cautious attitude, extending, perhaps, over many
years, is essential in order that we may be able in the end to take
our proper place on the shores of the Gulfs of Bothnia and Finland.
We must be particularly careful how we introduce any change into
the people’s mode of life, and must frankly admit that Finland has
reached a more advanced state of civilization than many of our
provinces, although this has been done mainly at the expense of the
Russian people. We should respect Finnish culture, in the hope that
when Finland is united to us it will assist and not harm us.”
2. _Western Frontier._—From Cape Polangen on the Baltic Coast to the
mouth of the Danube in the Black Sea Russia marches for 738 miles with
Germany, 761 with Austro-Hungary, and 467 with Roumania.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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