“It is a regrettable fact that so far, whenever we have taken the offensive, we have met with reverse. Owing to our lack of information, to which I have already drawn attention, instead of delivering a confident attack according to a clearly-thought-out plan, we have acted in a half-hearted manner. We often deliver our main attack too soon, and regardless of the enemy’s intentions. Instances have occurred where we have detailed attacking columns as small as a battalion; in others we have operated without any definite plan of action. Finally, there have been cases where not enough determination has been shown in pressing forward to the objective.” The importance of gaining even slight successes over the enemy’s advanced troops at the beginning of a forward movement, the fact that in the attack of positions turning movements should always be made in combination with frontal attacks, and the advantage of pushing on energetically when once an advance had commenced, were all points specially noted. The necessity of holding on determinedly to every yard of ground gained was accentuated, and leading units in a frontal attack were warned not to deliver the assault until the synchronous turning movement had been fully developed. Every use was to be made of fire-effect of every sort. I wrote: “A glaring case of that lack of co-operation from which we suffer so much was the fight of September 2,[7] when the left column began the action far too soon, and therefore finished by retiring in disorder. This had the worst results on the success of the whole operation. “I must again remind all ranks of the great necessity for economizing ammunition, especially gun ammunition. At Liao-yang we used up in two days our special artillery reserve of more than 100,000 rounds. The conveyance of gun ammunition to the front is very difficult, and batteries which have expended theirs become mere dead-weight to the army.” [Illustration: GENERAL LINIEVITCH.] The peculiarities attendant on operations in a country covered with such crops as _kao-liang_ were also reviewed in detail: “Any men leaving the ranks in action under pretext of accompanying or carrying away wounded men will be severely punished. “Companies and squadrons must be as strong as possible for an attack. To this end the most strict precautions must be taken to limit the number of men employed on extraneous duties and for transport work. The Cossacks are not to be employed as orderlies and escorts by the officers under whom they may be temporarily serving. Sound horses in possession of sick Cossacks should be taken from them, and made over to those who are horseless, but fit for duty.