The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 2 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far East — John Shaqi
The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 2 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far EastKuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
History
The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 2 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far East
Kuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905
“In attacking, especially among hills, the infantry must wait
so that the assault may be prepared by fire, in order to get
breath or to give time for the co-operation of a turning
movement. There is also another and involuntary reason for
halting—namely, the enemy’s fire. Owing to this, units halt,
or, what is worse, begin to retire without orders; what then
usually happens is this: A few men begin to trickle back from
some company that has come under a particularly hot fire; they
are followed by their own company, which is in turn followed
by the companies on either side, even though the latter may
perhaps be holding strong ground. Such a moment is, indeed,
critical, and unless some brilliant officer appears who
possesses the secret of rallying retreating men and succeeds
in making the company hold its ground, the action is lost. But
besides setting a personal example to the men, a commanding
officer must at once push forward some of his reserves to
stop the rot among those retreating. The most important thing
at such a crisis is the example set by the officers or the
steadiest men, particularly by Cavaliers of the Order of St.
George.[5] A company commander’s example is everything to his
company. Therefore, however deserving he may be in peace, a
company commander who does not display personal gallantry in
action should be instantly removed from his command.
“The most effective method of guarding against a sudden
emergency either in attack or defence—and this is particularly
true in hilly country—is to have in hand a strong reserve,
and not to make use of it too lightly. This we have not done
in recent actions; we have told off weak reserves, and used
them up too quickly. Whole regiments have sometimes been sent
in support where two companies or a battalion would have been
ample.[6]
“In all kinds of operations officers in command must keep the
forces on either flank, as well as their seniors, informed of
everything that happens. We are, unfortunately, not accustomed
to do this. Before an action the smallest details are reported,
but as soon as an action begins we become so preoccupied with
the fight that the most obvious duties are forgotten. Chief
staff-officers of all grades will in future be held responsible
for the frequent transmission of reports during an action.”
The special attention of commanding officers was also called to the
necessity for providing their men with hot food during action, and to
the excessive expenditure of ammunition in our fights.
_Instructions issued during September._
The following were the main instructions given by me while preparing
for an advance after the fighting in August:
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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