“This diagram shows Japan’s comparatively favourable situation with regard to the theatre of operations. Her base—indeed, her whole country—is only about 600 miles by sea from our shores, and 135 from Korea. “Our territory in Asia is so vast and so thinly populated that we shall be compelled to make European Russia, which is 3,400 to 6,000 miles distant, our base. For a protracted war with Japan it is evident that the single-line Siberian Railway will not suffice; we shall be obliged to lay a second track, and to increase the number of trains in the twenty-four hours. Also, as it runs for a considerable distance along the Chinese frontier and through Chinese territory, it cannot be relied on in the event of war with both China and Japan together.” We were glued to the railway, and could not move away without risk of being left without supplies. Our field artillery and heavy four-wheeled transport carts were unable to travel over most of the hill roads. The summer rains made the movements of the army, with its heavy baggage trains and parks, extremely difficult; teams of twenty horses were harnessed to guns, and even empty carts had to be man-handled. [Illustration: DIAGRAM SHOWING THE POSITION OF THE THEATRE OF WAR RELATIVELY TO RUSSIA AND JAPAN.] But of all our difficulties, the complete command of the sea obtained by the Japanese right at the beginning of the war caused the greatest. With their three armies they cut off Port Arthur, and began an advance from an enveloping base against our army, which was still tied to a railway-line. Our southward advance for the relief of Port Arthur was threatened by Kuroki’s army based on Korea. Any movement against him was out of the question, especially for those corps which had arrived from Russia, as they were quite unused to hilly country. Our communications through Manchuria were only weakly defended, and might be cut at any moment by the Chinese, while those further west were liable to interruption (bridges destroyed, strikes, frost, etc.). The feeding of the army depended on local resources, which a hostile population could easily conceal, carry away, or even destroy; and as the amount of supplies obtained from Russia was extremely small and uncertain, the army might very easily have been starved. The chance actions at the Ya-lu and Te-li-ssu, in which our most reliable troops were worsted, still further improved the enemy’s _moral_, and lowered ours.