operation was risky, because Kuroki and Nodzu might have driven back our screens and fallen on our communications. On June 26 and 27, when only one brigade of the 31st Division of the 10th Army Corps[13] had arrived at Liao-yang, the Japanese on the eastern front (Kuroki and Nodzu) themselves took the offensive and seized the passes (Fen-shui Ling, Mo-du Ling, Da Ling) on the Fen-shui-ling heights. We opposed them in insufficient strength, and did not even make them disclose their numbers. The troops of the eastern force withdrew towards Tkhavuop, and General Levestam’s force to Hsi-mu-cheng. Our screens were thus situated as follows: on Kuroki’s line of advance, only two marches from Hai-cheng; on Oku’s line of advance at Ta-shih-chiao, four marches from Liao-yang.[14] Our position was critical, particularly if the information we had received as to the Japanese collecting in considerable force to operate against Hai-cheng was confirmed. Still, if we were able to strike a rapid blow at Oku, we might rob the enemy of the initiative, and after forcing back Oku’s army, have fallen on Nodzu. After we had driven back these troops, Kuroki’s position would have been so far forward and so far separated from the other groups that the danger of his breaking through to Liao-yang would have been minimized. But for such decisive operations the first requisite was the concentration of sufficient troops for offensive operations against Oku. [Illustration: GENERAL BARON KITEN NOGI.] At the end of June we had altogether available against the three Japanese armies 120 battalions, and were inferior to the enemy both in the number of battalions and the number of men. Our position was made worse by an epidemic of dysentery which broke out amongst the troops at Ta-shih-chiao, and swept off a considerable number of men. The Krasnoyarsk Regiment[15] was the greatest sufferer, having as many as 1,500 men down with the disease at the end of the month. But the main thing which delayed any advance on our part was the rain, which made all moves difficult, and some places absolutely impassable for transport. It was even difficult to convey supplies to our various stationary forces over distances of less than a march. In spite of the lack of pack-saddles, wheeled transport had to be given up for pack transport, and not even pack-animals could do more than seven to eleven miles in the twenty-four hours. On the Liao-yang–Lang-tzu-shan road things were still worse, for the bridges over the mountain streams had been carried away, and communication between the eastern force (3rd Siberian Corps, under Count Keller) and Liao-yang was interrupted for some time. Far, therefore, from being ready to advance, the officers commanding the 1st and 4th Siberian Corps found the greatest difficulty in rationing their troops, and on June 29 asked that they might be withdrawn towards the positions near the railway at Ta-shih-chiao, and