that the country east of the line might be left to the cavalry, with a few infantry units in support.[16] General Count Keller was persistent in his demands that communication should be maintained between his force and Liao-yang, but we had neither the material, the means, nor the time to comply with his wishes, which would have meant the laying of a light railway and the strengthening of the road bridges. As I feared that the Japanese might make a fresh forward movement on Hai-cheng, I ordered thirty-nine battalions to concentrate near Hsi-mu-cheng on June 29. The short march from Hai-cheng was accomplished on the 28th with great difficulty through a sea of mud, and on the 29th Hsi-mu-cheng was temporarily cut off by the mountain streams in flood. The feeding of the troops collected there was found to be so difficult that as soon as it was known that the enemy, instead of advancing, had retired towards the Fen-shui Ling (Pass), certain units were ordered to return to the railway. Taking advantage, on July 18, of the screen formed by a portion of the 17th Army Corps, we attempted to advance against part of Kuroki’s army in the hope of forcing our way forward and gaining a partial success. For this Count Keller had under his command forty-three battalions, but the attempt failed. He stopped the action before any large number of our troops had become engaged. On the 29th Oku’s army took the offensive; we had to evacuate Ta-shih-chiao and Newchuang after a feeble resistance, and allowed Oku and Nodzu to join hands. When on July 23 I inspected the units of the 10th Army Corps, who were holding the position near Hu-chia-tzu, I found out how absolutely incapable of operating in hilly country the troops newly arrived from Russia were. Before sending them forward, it was necessary to train them in hill fighting, and to provide them with pack transport. On July 31 all three Japanese armies advanced, and we concentrated after a series of battles round Liao-yang. Here, in spite of our resistance, the three armies were able to join hands. Their attacks on the left bank of the Tai-tzu Ho were repulsed, but owing to the unfortunate nature of our operations on the right bank, the conditions became so unfavourable to us that I was obliged to order a retirement to Mukden. The withdrawal was conducted without the loss of a single gun or transport cart, while the enemy lost in men more heavily than we did. In the detailed accounts I have given in the first three volumes of the operations at Liao-yang, on the Sha Ho and at Mukden, our difficulties and the causes of our defeats are explained. The course of events showed that our original scheme of operations was quite a correct forecast, for in it the probable necessity of retiring towards Harbin had been foreseen. Indeed, matters at Liao-yang, on the Sha Ho, and especially at Mukden, might have been very much worse for us than they were, and might have necessitated our retirement on Harbin