The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 2 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far EastKuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
History
The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 2 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far East
Kuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905
“Other European armies are now doing everything possible to
minimize the murderous effect of modern rifle and artillery
fire on themselves, and are, at the same time, endeavouring
to develop their own fire to the utmost, both in the attack
and defence; indeed, the Germans, in their efforts to this
end, have gone the extreme length of deploying all their
troops—sometimes even to the sacrifice of their reserves—in
long thin lines. We, on the other hand, judging by the last
manœuvres, are going to the other extreme, for our decisive
attack is delivered almost without any fire preparation, and
with men massed in quarter column!
“If a stop is not put to the increasing density of our attack
formations, we shall suffer for it heavily. It is all the more
dangerous for us, as we do not assist our assaulting infantry
properly with supporting gun and rifle fire.
“5. _The Work of the Artillery._
“Artillery positions were in most cases skilfully chosen, but
the fire discipline was often bad. As batteries can only carry
a limited number of rounds in the field, it is vital that the
gunners should be taught to economize every round; this is, of
course, particularly important with quick-firing guns. But we
often fired more rounds than were necessary: fire was opened
too hurriedly, at quite unimportant targets, with the result
that, at the critical moment of the attack, batteries had to
signal that they were in action, for all their ammunition had
been expended.[1]
“6. _The Work of the Sappers._
“The bloody lessons of Plevna and Gora Dubniak put fresh life
into our military engineering, which lasted for a certain
time after the Turkish War. Our sappers became skilful at
constructing trenches and redoubts, and the other troops were
also trained in field-works, and began to like entrenching
themselves. But a reaction soon set in. This was largely due
to General Dragomiroff, who did much to bring about a return
to the old order of things, when it was held that everything
was decided by the bayonet. He was quite opposed to the use of
cover, and carried his orders on this subject to the height of
absurdity, even forbidding his men to lie down while advancing
to attack!
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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