The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 2 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far EastKuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
History
The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 2 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far East
Kuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905
Before the war no army corps organization had been worked out for
the reserve troops; everything had been arranged for a divisional
organization. In my opinion, neither corps nor divisions are
necessary. It would be more advantageous to form the reserve units
into independent brigades of eight battalions, and to use them as army
troops, or possibly as corps troops. The mobilization of the reserve
artillery, sapper, and cavalry, should take place together with that of
the infantry. Every reserve brigade of eight battalions (8,000 rifles)
should have, with two batteries of twelve guns, one company of sappers
and one reserve squadron of cavalry or a _sotnia_ of Cossacks. This
arrangement would permit of reserve troops being employed on secondary
objects without the organization of the army being broken up, and it
would no longer be necessary to find so many divisional and corps
commanders, with their numerous staffs.
STEPS TO AUGMENT THE COMBATANT ELEMENT IN OUR INFANTRY.
Amongst the causes of our disasters has been mentioned (Chapter
VI.) the small number of rifles per company we had in action as
compared with the Japanese. We often had more battalions than they,
but fewer men. The various reasons for this I have already enumerated.
To lessen the number of subsidiary duties which take men away from
the fighting-line of the regular army, we must create cadres for the
troops of the rear services; we must also arrange that the casualties
are quickly made good from the reserve troops, which should be kept
up permanently and closely connected with the regular troops. (Every
regular regiment should have one reserve or depôt battalion.) To
augment the numbers fighting compared with the numbers fed, and, in
particular, to increase the number of men in the firing-line, we must
bring up the combatant establishment of our companies from 220 to 250
rifles. With 220 rifles on the roll of a company, we were never able
to put even 200 in action; and in bringing the strength of these units
up to 250, we must take steps to see that they all really can take the
field. According to the “War Establishments,” a line infantry regiment
has an establishment of 3,838 combatants and 159[39] non-combatants
(total 3,997), which gives 235 rifles per company. But in this
number are included 35 bandsmen, 33 drummers, 1 bugler, 3 regimental
quartermaster-sergeants, 1 sergeant-major of the non-combatant company,
5 baggage non-commissioned officers, and, moreover, another 240 (15
per company) detailed for supply work, etc. Excluding these, 3,520
combatants are left, which gives 220 per company; but experience has
shown that there is much leakage from this number.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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