intensified, if at all, by the further explanation by Count Lamsdorff on February 6, that “when it came to the final and complete evacuation of Manchuria, the Russian Government would be obliged to obtain from the central Government of China an effective guarantee against the recurrence of the recent attack on her frontier and the destruction of her railway, but had no intention of seeking this guarantee in any acquisition of territory or of an actual or virtual protectorate over Manchuria, the object being to simply guarantee the faithful observance in the future by China of the terms of the agreement [agreement between the Chinese Government and the Russo-Chinese Bank, September 28, 1896?], which she had been unable to fulfill during the disturbances. The terms of this guarantee might possibly form the subject of conversation here between Count Lamsdorff and the Chinese Minister, or be left for discussion at Peking.”[339] A month before this official statement of Russia reached the London Government, the latter heard from the Japanese Minister, Baron Hayashi, that Russia and China had already made at St. Petersburg some arrangement regarding Manchuria,[340] evidently referred to by Count Lamsdorff in the quoted passage as “an effective guarantee.” ----- Footnote 318: The Court had fled toward Ta-yuen-Fu before the allied troops reached Peking, and thence started toward Si-ngan-Fu, the capital of many a historic dynasty, on October 1. Footnote 319: Russia had early advocated accepting Li as plenipotentiary, while other Powers were still skeptical of the nature of his credentials. See _China, No. 1 (1901)_, Nos. 254, 356, 368, 371, 398, 401; _China, No. 5 (1901)_, Nos. 5, 31, 111, 112, 128, 216; U. S. 56th Congress, 2d Session, _House Documents_, vol. i. pp. 203–204, 305–306, 381–382. It was not till September 20 that Li entered Peking. Prince Ching had arrived there September 3. The appointment of the Prince as a plenipotentiary is said to have been partly due to Japanese influence. Footnote 320: _Documents diplomatiques: Chine, 1899–1900_, No. 327 (p. 174). Also see _China, No. 5 (1901)_, pp. 5, 46, 53–54. Footnote 321: _China, No. 5 (1901)_, No. 17. Footnote 322: For the Japanese amendments, see _ibid._, Nos. 60, 151, 178. Footnote 323: Russia openly declared in her _Messager Officiel_ of March 24 (April 6), 1901, that the Russian views regarding the settlement of the trouble in North China, as distinguished from Manchuria, had “served the French Government as a basis for the elaboration” of the latter’s propositions.—_China, No. 2 (1904)_, pp. 20–21. Footnote 324: November 5.—_China, No. 5 (1901)_, No. 117. Footnote 325: November 28.—_Ibid._, Nos. 178 and 198. Footnote 326: _China, No. 2 (1904)_, p. 21. Footnote 327: _Ibid._, p. 20. Footnote 328: