“His Majesty’s Government had been largely influenced in their decision to enter into this important contract by the conviction that it contains no provisions which can be regarded as an indication of aggressive or self-seeking tendencies in the regions to which it applies. It has been concluded purely as a measure of precaution, to be invoked, should occasion arise, in the defence of important British interests. It in no way threatens the present position or the legitimate interests of other Powers. On the contrary, that part of it which renders either of the High Contracting Parties liable to be called upon by the other for assistance can operate only when one of the allies has found himself obliged to go to war in defence of interests which are common to both, when the circumstances in which he has taken this step are such as to establish that the quarrel has not been of his own seeking, and when, being engaged in his own defence, he finds himself threatened, not only by a single Power, but by a hostile coalition. “His Majesty’s Government trust that the Agreement may be found of mutual advantage to the two countries, that it will make for the preservation of peace, and that, should peace be unfortunately broken, it will have the effect of restricting the area of hostilities. “I am, etc., “LANSDOWNE.”[404] The singular nature of these documents stands out so clearly on their face that it hardly needs a special reference. Not only has Manchuria at last been clearly interpreted by both Powers as lying within the scope of the Agreement, but it is explicitly admitted therein that Japan possesses extensive interests in the Korean peninsula, which is for that reason included in the sphere within which the contracting parties unequivocally disavow aggressive tendencies. Nor does this sum up all the difference between this and the Anglo-German Agreement, for, while in the latter the denial of the parties’ aggressive designs was limited to the period of the Boxer complication, and, moreover, coupled with a reservation amounting to the recognition of the theory of readjusting the balance between the Powers at the expense of China, the new alliance unconditionally upholds the independence of China and Korea, and any measure, either peaceful or warlike, taken by either party to safeguard its interests, if they are in any way threatened, would by no means alter its devotion to the principles of the territorial integrity of the Chinese and Korean Empires and of the open door in those countries. The alliance exists solely for the purpose of effectively safe-guarding the interests already acquired by the two Powers on the common ground, and it is implied in an unmistakable manner that those interests may best be maintained by the total abstention, in any event, from all aggressive or