“‘The Imperial Government, in their original proposition to the Russian Government in August last, endeavored to make it entirely clear that they desired, with a view to remove from the Japanese-Russian relations every cause for future misunderstanding, to bring within the purview of the proposed arrangement all those regions in the Extreme East where the interests of the two Empires met. They cannot believe that a full realization of that desire could be expected if a large and important section of those regions was wholly excluded from the understanding. Accordingly, the Imperial Government feel constrained to ask the Russian Government to reconsider their position on the subject, and they hope that the Russian Government will be able to see their way to arrive at a satisfactory solution of the question. [Illustration: MR. KURINO _Late Japanese Minister at St. Petersburg_ ] “‘The Imperial Government also find it necessary to ask for the following amendments to the new Russian counter-proposals:— “‘_a._ ARTICLE II. to read: Recognition by Russia of Japan’s preponderating interests in Korea, and of the right of Japan to give Korea advice and assistance tending to improve the administration of the Korean Empire; “‘_b._ ARTICLE V. to read: Mutual engagement not to undertake on the Korean coast any military works capable of menacing the freedom of navigation in the Korean Straits; and “‘_c._ ARTICLE VI. to be suppressed. “‘Not only as the main points of these amendments cannot be said to be in excess of the modifications which were agreed to _ad referendum_ at Tokio, but also as the Imperial Government considered those changes indispensable, it is believed that they will receive the ready agreement of the Russian Government.’ “In presenting the foregoing note to Count Lamsdorff, you will say that I have spoken to Minister Rosen in a similar sense, and you will also express the desire for a prompt reply.”[645] Mr. Kurino carried out his instructions on December 23, and telegraphed on the same day to Baron Komura: “... He [Count Lamsdorff] told me he had received a telegram from Minister Rosen, stating that the latter had had an interview with Baron Komura, and that particulars would follow; but such particulars had not yet been received by him [the Count.][646] When I handed him the _note verbale_, he received it, and said that he would do his best to send the Russian answer at the earliest possible date; but added that he would have to communicate with Viceroy Alexieff. In conclusion I stated to the Count that, under existing circumstances, it might cause serious difficulties, even complications, if we failed to come to an _entente_, and I hoped he would exercise his best influence so as to enable us to reach the desired end.”[647]