Footnote 640: Article 5. Footnote 641: Article 6. Footnote 642: Observe the following passage from the explanatory note issued by the Foreign Office at St. Petersburg on February 9, 1904:— “Last year, the Tokio Cabinet, under the pretext of establishing the balance of power and a more settled order of things on the shores of the Pacific, submitted to the Imperial Government a proposal for a revision of the existing treaties _with Korea_. Russia consented, and Viceroy Alexieff was charged to draw up a project for a new understanding with Japan in coöperation with the Russian Minister at Tokio, who was intrusted with the negotiations with the Japanese Government. Although the exchange of views with the Tokio Cabinet on this subject was of a friendly character, Japanese social circles and the local and foreign press attempted in every way to produce a warlike ferment among the Japanese, and to drive the Government into an armed conflict with Russia. Under the influence thereof, the _Tokio Cabinet began to formulate greater and greater demands in the negotiations_, at the same time taking most extensive measures to make the country ready for war.” (The italics are the author’s.) Footnote 643: _N.-R._, Nos. 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 33. Footnote 644: The second reply was as follows:— “1. Mutual engagement to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Korean Empire. “2. Recognition by Russia of Japan’s preponderating interest in Korea, and of the right of Japan to assist Korea with advice tending to improve her civil administration. “3. Engagement on the part of Russia not to oppose the development of the industrial and commercial activities of Japan in Korea, nor the adoption of measures for the protection of those interests. “4. Recognition by Russia of the right of Japan to send troops to Korea for the purpose mentioned in the preceding Article, or for the purpose of suppressing insurrections or disorders liable to create international complications. “5. Mutual engagement not to make use of any part of the Korean territory for strategical purposes, and not to undertake on the Korean coast any military works capable of menacing the freedom of navigation in the Korean Straits. “6. Mutual engagement to consider the territory of Korea to the north of the thirty-ninth parallel as a neutral zone, within the limits of which neither of the contracting parties shall introduce troops. “7. Mutual engagement not to impede the connection of the Korean and Eastern Chinese Railways, when those railways shall have been extended to the Yalu. “8. Abrogation of all previous agreements between Russia and Japan respecting Korea.”—_N.-R._, No. 34. Footnote 645: _N.-R._, No. 35. Footnote 646: Is it probable that Baron Rosen consulted Viceroy Alexieff by telegraph before he did Count Lamsdorff? Footnote 647: _N.-R._, No. 36.