for the non-eternity of the Veda is easily perceived by any _yogin_ endowed with the transcendent faculties (_tívra_,[246] &c.) Therefore, when God has been rendered propitious by the performance of duties which produce His favour, the desired end, Liberation, is obtained; thus everything is clear. E. B. C. * * * * * NOTE ON PAGES 172, 173. We have here an exemplification of the five fallacies or _hetvábhásas_ of the modern Hindu logic (cf. _Siddhántamukt._, § 71, _Tarkasaṃgr._, 55-67), viz., _anaikánta_, _viruddha_, _asiddha_, _kálátyayopadishṭa_ or _bádhita_, and _pratipakshita_ or _sat-pratipaksha_. The four first of these generally correspond to the _savyabhichára_ or "erratic," _viruddha_ or "contradictory," _sádhyasama_ or "unproved," and _atítakála_ or "mistimed," _i.e._, "precluded," as given in the list of fallacies of the older logic in p. 164; but _pratipakshita_ corresponds imperfectly to _prakaraṇasama_. The _prakaraṇasama_ or "uncertain" reason is properly that reason which is equally available for both sides, as, _e.g._, the argument, "Sound is eternal because it is audible," which could be met by the equally plausible argument, "Sound is non-eternal because it is audible;" or, according to other authorities, it is that reason which itself raises the same difficulties as the original question, as, _e.g._, "sound is non-eternal because eternal qualities are not perceived in it;" here this alleged reason is as much the subject of dispute as the old question, "Is sound eternal?" But the _pratipakshita_ reason is one which is counter-balanced by an equally valid reason, as "Sound is eternal because it is audible," and "Sound is non-eternal because it is a product." FOOTNOTES: [Footnote 205: Cf. Nyáya Sútras, i. 29.] [Footnote 206: In p. 112, line 16, of the Calcutta edition, I read _doshanimitta-tattva_ for _doshanimittakatva_ (compare Nyáya Sút. iv. 68).] [Footnote 207: Without this last clause the definition might include the objects (_vishaya_), as these are, of course, connected with right knowledge.] [Footnote 208: Íśvara is a cause of right knowledge (_pramáṇa_) according to the definition, because he is _pramáyá áśrayaḥ_.] [Footnote 209: On this compare Siddhánta-Muktávali, p. 115.] [Footnote 210: On these compare my note to Colebrooke's Essays, vol. i. p. 315.] [Footnote 211: "Our coming to the conclusion that there can be no smoke in the hill if there be no fire, while we _see_ the smoke, is the confutation of there being no fire in the hill" (_Ballantyne_). Or, in other words, "the mountain must have the absence-of-smoke (_vyápaka_) if it has the absence-of-fire (the false _vyápya_").] [Footnote 212: Action (_pravṛitti_) follows after the ascertainment of the truth by _nyáya_.] [Footnote 213: Cp. Vátsyáyana's Comment., p. 6. The Calcutta edition reads _prakírtitá_ for _paríkshitá_.]