The Sarva-Darsana-Samgraha: Or, Review of the Different Systems of Hindu PhilosophyMadhava
ReligionEastern
The Sarva-Darsana-Samgraha: Or, Review of the Different Systems of Hindu Philosophy
Madhava
Philosophy, Hindu; Philosophy, Indic
(_b._) "But [the Naiyáyikas will ask] does not this recognition of _g_
and other letters [as the same which we heard before] refer to the
species which exists the same in each, and not to the several
individual letters, since, in fact, we perceive that they are
different as uttered by different persons, otherwise we could not make
such distinctions as we do when we say 'Somaśarman is reading'?" This
objection, however, has as little brilliancy as its predecessors, for
as there is no proof of any distinction between the individual _g_'s,
there is no proof that we ought to assume any such thing as a species
_g_; and we maintain that, just as to the man who does not understand
[the Naiyáyika doctrine of] the species _g_, the one species [in the
Naiyáyika view] will by the influence of distinction of place,
magnitude, form, and individual sounds, appear as if it were variously
modified as itself distinct in place, as small, as great, as long, as
short; so to the man who does not understand our [Mímáṃsaka doctrine
of] one individual _g_, the one _g_ (in our view) will by the
diversity of "manifesters,"[271] appear to him associated with their
respective peculiarities; and as contrary characters are in this way
ascribed [to the letter _g_], there is a fallacious appearance of
distinction [between different _g_'s]. But does this ascription of
contrary characters, which is thus regarded as creating a difference
[between the _g_'s], result (1.) from the nature of the thing, or (2.)
from our imagination? There is no proof of the former alternative;
for, if it were true, as an inherent difference would have to be
admitted between different _g_'s, we should have to say, "Chaitra has
uttered ten _g's_," and not "Chaitra has uttered the same _g_ ten
times." On the latter supposition, there is no proof of any inherent
distinction between _g_'s, for inherent oneness is not destroyed by a
difference of external disguises. Thus we must not conceive, from the
apparent distinction caused by such external disguises as jars, &c.,
that there is any inherent distinction, as of parts, in the one
indivisible ether. The current use of the rejected phrase [_i.e._,
"different" as applied to the _g_'s] is really caused by the _noise_,
which in each case is different. This has been said by the great
teacher--
"The object which the Naiyáyikas seek by supposing a species
is, in fact, gained from the letter itself; and the object
which they aim at by supposing an individuality in letters,
is attained from audible noises;[272] so that the assumption
of species is useless."
And again--
"Since in regard to sounds such an irresistible instinct of
recognition is always awake within us, it precludes by its
superior evidence all the inferences to prove sound's
non-eternity."
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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