Here, however, an objector may urge, "But should we not rather say that the _sphoṭa_ has no power to convey the meaning, as it fails under either of the following alternatives, for is it supposed to convey the meaning when itself manifested or unmanifested? Not the latter, because it would then follow that we should find the effect of conveying the meaning always produced, since, as _sphoṭa_ is supposed to be eternal, and there would thus be an ever-present cause independent of all subsidiary aids, the effect could not possibly fail to appear. Therefore, to avoid this fault, we must allow the other alternative, viz., that _sphoṭa_ conveys the meaning when it is itself manifested. Well, then, do the manifesting letters exercise this manifesting power separately or combined? Whichever alternative you adopt, the very same faults which you alleged against the hypothesis of the letters expressing the meaning, will have to be met in your hypothesis that they have this power to manifest _sphoṭa_." This has been said by Bhaṭṭa in his Mímáṃsá-śloka-várttika-- "The grammarian who holds that _sphoṭa_ is manifested by the letters as they are severally apprehended, though itself one and indivisible, does not thereby escape from a single difficulty." The truth is, that, as Páṇini (i. 4, 14) and Gotama (Sút. ii. 123) both lay it down that letters only then form a word when they have an affix at the end, it is the letters which convey the word's meaning through the apprehension of the conventional association of ideas which they help.[326] If you object that as there are the same letters in _rasa_ as in _sara_, in _nava_ as in _vana_, in _díná_ as in _nadí_, in _mára_ as in _ráma_, in _rája_ as in _jára_, &c., these several pairs of words would not convey a different meaning, we reply that the difference in the order of the letters will produce a difference in the meaning. This has been said by Tautátita-- "As are the letters in number and kind, whose power is perceived in conveying any given meaning of a word, so will be the meaning which they convey." Therefore, as there is a well-known rule that when the same fault attaches to both sides of an argument it cannot be urged against one alone, we maintain that the hypothesis of the existence of a separate thing called _sphoṭa_ is unnecessary, as we have proved that it is the letters which express the word's meaning [your arguments against our view having been shown to be irrelevant].