The important problem now presents itself: What is the material, the
matter, which is handed down from generation to generation as the
basis of inheritance? Weismann, as we know, regarded it as a very
complicated structure, part of which by its disintegration became the
foundation of individual embryology. We have disproved, on the authority
of many facts, the latter part of this assumption; but of course the
first part of it may turn out to be true in spite of this. We have no
means at present to enable us to say *a priori* anything positive or
negative about the important question of the nature of that matter, the
continuity of which in inheritance is in some sense a self-evident fact,
and we therefore shall postpone the answer until a later point of our
analytical discussion.
ON CERTAIN THEORIES WHICH SEEK TO COMPARE INHERITANCE TO MEMORY
It will be advisable first to study some other theoretical views which
have been put forward with regard to inheritance. The physiologist
Hering, as early as 1876, compared all heredity to the well-known fact
of memory, assuming, so to say, a sort of remembrance of all that
has happened to the species in the continuity of its generations;
and several German authors, especially Semon, have lately made this
hypothesis the basis of more detailed speculation.
It is not clear, either from Hering’s paper[121] or from Semon’s
book,[122] what is really to be understood here by the word “memory,”
and, of course, there might be understood by it very different things,
according to the author’s psychological point of view. If he is a
“parallelist” with regard to so-called psychical phenomena, he would use
the word memory only as a sort of collective term to signify a resultant
effect of many single mechanical events, as far as the material world of
his parallel system comes into account, with which of course the problem
of inheritance alone deals; but if he maintains the theory of so-called
psycho-physical interaction, the psychical would be to him a primary
factor in nature, and so also would memory. As we have said, it is by no
means clear in what sense the word “memory” is used by our authors, and
therefore the *most* important point about the matter in question must
remain *in dubio*.
[121] *Ueber das Gedächtnis als eine allgemeine Function der organischen
Materie*, Wien, 1870. New edition in *Klassiker d. exakt. Wiss.*,
Leipzig, Engelmann.
[122] *Die Mneme*, Leipzig, 1904.
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