The social contract & discoursesRousseau, Jean-Jacques
Philosophy
The social contract & discourses
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques
Economics; Political science -- Early works to 1800; Social contract
If we reflect with ever so little attention on this subject, we shall
find new arguments to confirm this truth, and be convinced from the
very nature of the contract that it cannot be irrevocable: for, if
there were no superior power capable of ensuring the fidelity of the
contracting parties, or compelling them to perform their reciprocal
engagements, the parties would be sole judges in their own cause, and
each would always have a right to renounce the contract, as soon as he
found that the other had violated its terms, or that they no longer
suited his convenience. It is upon this principle that the right of
abdication may possibly be founded. Now, if, as here, we consider
only what is human in this institution, it is certain that, if the
magistrate, who has all the power in his own hands, and appropriates
to himself all the advantages of the contract, has none the less a
right to renounce his authority, the people, who suffer for all the
faults of their chief, must have a much better right to renounce their
dependence. But the terrible and innumerable quarrels and disorders
that would necessarily arise from so dangerous a privilege, show,
more than anything else, how much human governments stood in need of
a more solid basis than mere reason, and how expedient it was for the
public tranquillity that the divine will should interpose to invest the
sovereign authority with a sacred and inviolable character, which might
deprive subjects of the fatal right of disposing of it. If the world
had received no other advantages from religion, this would be enough to
impose on men the duty of adopting and cultivating it, abuses and all,
since it has been the means of saving more blood than fanaticism has
ever spilt. But let us follow the thread of our hypothesis.
The different forms of government owe their origin to the differing
degrees of inequality which existed between individuals at the time
of their institution. If there happened to be any one man among them
pre-eminent in power, virtue, riches or personal influence, he became
sole magistrate, and the State assumed the form of monarchy. If
several, nearly equal in point of eminence, stood above the rest, they
were elected jointly, and formed an aristocracy. Again, among a people
who had deviated less from a state of nature, and between whose fortune
or talents there was less disproportion, the supreme administration was
retained in common, and a democracy was formed. It was discovered in
process of time which of these forms suited men the best. Some peoples
remained altogether subject to the laws; others soon came to obey their
magistrates. The citizens laboured to preserve their liberty; the
subjects, irritated at seeing others enjoying a blessing they had lost,
thought only of making slaves of their neighbours. In a word, on the
one side arose riches and conquests, and on the other happiness and I
virtue.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account