The social contract & discoursesRousseau, Jean-Jacques
Philosophy
The social contract & discourses
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques
Economics; Political science -- Early works to 1800; Social contract
The peculiar fact about this alienation is that, in taking over the
goods of individuals, the community, so far from despoiling them, only
assures them legitimate possession, and changes usurpation into a true
right and enjoyment into proprietorship. Thus the possessors, being
regarded as depositaries of the public good, and having their rights,
respected by all the members of the State and maintained against
foreign aggression by all its forces, have, by a cession which benefits
both the public and still more themselves, acquired, so to speak,
all that they gave up. This paradox may easily be explained by the
distinction between the rights which the Sovereign and the proprietor
have over the same estate, as we shall see later on. It may also happen
that men begin to unite one with another before they possess anything,
and that, subsequently occupying a tract of country which is enough for
all, they enjoy it in common, or share it out among themselves, either
equally or according to a scale fixed by they Sovereign. However the
acquisition be made, the right which each individual has to his own
estate is always subordinate to the right which the community has over
all: without this, there would be neither stability in the social tie,
nor real force in the exercise of Sovereignty.
I shall end this chapter and this book by remarking on a fact on
which the whole social system should rest: _i.e._ that, instead of
destroying natural inequality, the fundamental compact substitutes,
for such physical inequality as nature may have set up between men, an
equality that is moral and legitimate, and that men, who may be unequal
in strength or intelligence, become every one equal by convention and
legal right.[1]
BOOK II
CHAPTER I
THAT SOVEREIGNTY IS INALIENABLE
The first and most important deduction from the principles we have
so far laid down is that the general will alone can direct the State
according to the object for which it was instituted, _i.e._ the
common good: for if the clashing of particular interests made the
establishment of societies necessary, the agreement of these very
interests made it possible. The common element in these different
interests is what forms the social tie; and, were there no point of
agreement between them all, no society could exist. It is solely on the
basis of this common interest that every society should be governed.
I hold then that Sovereignty, being nothing less than the exercise of
the general will, can never be alienated, and that the Sovereign, who
is no less than a collective being, cannot be represented except by
himself: the power indeed may be transmitted, but not the will.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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