The social contract & discoursesRousseau, Jean-Jacques
Philosophy
The social contract & discourses
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques
Economics; Political science -- Early works to 1800; Social contract
Everything conspires to take away from a man who is set in authority
over others the sense of justice and reason. Much trouble, we are
told, is taken to teach young princes the art of reigning; but their
education seems to do them no good. It would be better to begin by
teaching them the art of obeying. The greatest kings whose praises
history tells were not brought up to reign: reigning is a science we
are never so far from possessing as when we have learnt too much of
it, and one we acquire better by obeying than by commanding. "Nam
utilissimus idem ac brevissimus bonarum malarumque rerum delectus
cogitare quid aut nolueris sub alio principe, aut volueris."[2]
One result of this lack of coherence is the inconstancy of royal
government, which, regulated now on one scheme and now on another,
according to the character of the reigning prince or those who
reign for him, cannot for long have a fixed object or a consistent
policy--and this variability, not found in the other forms of
government, where the prince is always the same, causes the State to
be always shifting from principle to principle and from project to
project. Thus we may say that generally, if a court is more subtle
in intrigue, there is more wisdom in a senate, and Republics advance
towards their ends by more consistent and better considered policies;
while every revolution in a royal ministry creates a revolution in
the State; for the principle common to all ministers and nearly all
kings is to do in every respect the reverse of what was done by their
predecessors.
This incoherence further clears up a sophism that is very familiar to
royalist political writers; not only is civil government likened to
domestic government, and the prince to the father of a family--this
error has already been refuted--but the prince is also freely credited
with all the virtues he ought to possess, and is supposed to be always
what he should be. This supposition once made, royal government is
clearly preferable to all others, because it is incontestably the
strongest, and, to be the best also, wants only a corporate will more
in conformity with the general will.
But if, according to Plato,[3] the "king by nature" is such a rarity,
how often will nature and fortune conspire to give him a crown? And, if
royal education necessarily corrupts those who receive it, what is to
be hoped from a series of men brought up to reign? It is, then, wanton
self-deception to confuse royal government with government by a good
king. To see such government as it is in itself, we must consider it as
it is under princes who are incompetent or wicked: for either they will
come to the throne wicked or incompetent, or the throne will make them
so.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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