This is the system of government to which the Judge refers us, as containing the idea, in the fourth resolution, that senators ought “to hold their offices for a term sufficient to insure their independence, namely, seven years,” and that they ought to be “ineligible to state or federal office _during their term of service_.” This resolution was written with the avowed object of {685} keeping the state governments from interfering in any way,—even by the allurements of office,—with an officer who was designed to be an intrinsic part of an entirely separate consolidated general government; and the _rejection_ of that very system and the reasons assigned for it in the debates, prove, beyond doubt, that the objection to it was because it left the states, _as states_, and their governments and sovereignty, without representation, and of course without protection. The Judge quotes a _rejected_ clause, to prove the _adoption_ of its principles! MR. MADISON was opposed to the amendment. He did not wish to leave the state legislatures this modicum of federal power, because he wished a distinct and _independent_ government. He must have foreseen the exercise of instructions and recognized the right; or he could not have used the expressions which fell from him when the right of election was given to state legislatures. All who knew MR. MADISON, or are at all familiar with his history, and his writings on the formation of the constitution, must remember that he was haunted and hag-ridden by a terror of disunion; and federal weakness, which, to us, at the present day, would seem almost a monomania, if recent startling events had not fearfully proven that this phantom is ever armed and ready to assume a tangible shape, and realize, in practice, those terrible consequences which his second-sighted sagacity could so manifestly mark in the dim picture of the future. His fear of the state legislatures led him to favor GOVERNOR RANDOLPH'S proposition,—which was to have the senators selected by the house of representatives, out of a certain number of persons nominated by the state legislatures. This would have adroitly used the best possible body for judicious nomination, without giving it the power of appointment. Without representation, they would have been without the right of instruction, and the election being made by the house of representatives, the constitution of the senate would have had another _national_ feature, and its members been removed as far as practicable from state influence.