When the first and fatal blow was stricken at this system by giving the election to the Legislatures, MR. MADISON'S hopes of a national government, entirely distinct and independent of state governments, were at once prostrated. Then he used the language quoted by Judge H. “We are proceeding in the same manner that was done when the confederation was first formed. Its original draft was excellent, but in its progress to completion it became so insufficient as to give rise to the present convention. By the vote already taken, will not the temper of the state legislatures transfuse itself into the senate? Do we create a free government?” Our distinguished opponent asks what would he have said, had he known that a right of instruction would be claimed? He could have said no more—indeed he could not have used so much force without knowing it. How else can the _temper_ transfuse itself? Is it only by an election every _six years_, leaving the senators independent in the interval? Would not the legislative _nominations_ have _transfused the temper_ quite as effectually? The legislatures would only have nominated those who concurred in sentiment with a majority of their members; and all that the house of representatives would have done would have been to elect the most moderate, if they differed, and the most violent if they agreed with the state legislature. The difference between the two modes, as to the transfusion of temper, was almost nothing without instructions, but very great with it; and as Mr. M. seemed to think the amendment almost annihilated his scheme, we must suppose he objected more to the incidental right of instruction given by the vote, than the principal right of election from which it flowed. Notwithstanding Mr. M.'s strenuous opposition, the change was made by a vote of _nine states to two_—thus evincing a decided determination in that body to enable the states to defend themselves, and _transfuse their temper_ if necessary. Judge H. tortures Mr. M.'s objections to the new system into an evidence of ignorance of one of the most important consequences of that system, without a knowledge of which, his reasons would have been of little force, and his fears utterly without foundation. The clauses which the Judge quotes in the fourth resolution, were left in their original form by the advocates of state power, in the first consideration in committee, being satisfied with their great gain in the mode of election; but they were afterwards stricken out, being a part of the scheme which had been rejected, and inconsistent with the spirit of the amended resolution. The proposal and subsequent rejection of the express terms of senatorial _independence_, prove that the convention disapproved of the idea; but Judge H. quotes it as evidence of “an intention to make the senators equally independent of the several states and of the United States.”