It may be pertinent to remark in this connection that the law prohibiting these certifications by National Banks is unnecessary and unwise, as is evidenced by the facility and safety with which it is honored in the breach. State Banks in New York are under no such restriction, nor has it occurred to our lawmakers that a necessity for the prohibition exists. The experience of these banks in the matter of certifications, like that of the National Banks, shows that the business is safe and sound. If the merchant discounts his paper for thirty, sixty, or ninety days, why prevent a similar accommodation to stockbrokers for an hour or two? Both are engaged in a strictly legitimate business upon which the welfare of the community in greater or less degree depends, and the fundamental purpose of a bank is to promote and encourage such business. That is what banks are for, and bank officers are supposed to know something about how, when, and where accommodations may be extended with safety to all concerned. Mr. Horace White cites the year 1909 as an illustration of the employment of loanable bank funds by brokers which brings up another point. For long periods in that year, money loaned on call on the floor of the New York Stock Exchange at 1½ per cent., while our banks were paying 2 per cent. to the interior banks to which the money belonged. This does not necessarily mean that the banks were losing money; because the greater part of these funds was employed in time loans and in commercial discounts at 3 and 4 per cent., thus raising the average income rate. There is also to be considered the unearned increment which the bank gains by “holding” its depositor, even though no large profit accrues from the funds thus deposited.[44] As the ratio of reserves to liabilities at that time was much above the legal requirement, it might be inferred from this and from the 1½ per cent. rate that money was easy; but it was not, as many persons in commercial pursuits learned when they tried to borrow it. There was a great deal of money that was not being used in daily business, and one of the reasons was that the period was one of distrust. Stockbrokers got funds at 1½ per cent. while many other borrowers were required to pay stiffer rates, because the banks that controlled the money market--i. e., the loanable funds--were unwilling to part with them except for short periods and on instantly marketable security, and this state of mind on the part of the New York bankers was shared by the bankers of Europe. It was good banking, because it was prudent and conservative. In other words, at a time when danger threatened, bankers in all important centres of the world regarded Stock Exchange collateral as ideal security, and, as we have seen, the aggregate of their loanable funds pressing on the market kept call rates down to 1½. If in times of doubt and distrust this form of collateral proves its safety, is it not a fair hypothesis that it is safe at _all_ times?