As the faults of the Platonic and Aristotelian systems are seen to be connected with the general character of Greek life, it becomes obvious how difficult it must have been for Greeks to emancipate themselves from them. To overcome the difficulty nothing short of a radical breaking away from old lines of thought would avail. The origin of ideas, the primary meaning of conceptions, must be enquired into with searching thoroughness; a sharper distinction must be drawn between what is supplied from without and what is supplied from within; the truth of axioms hitherto received in metaphysics must be more carefully investigated than had ever been done as yet. The intellect must accustom itself to an accuracy of observation, and to a strictness of inductive process, never before reached in Greece. Experimental sciences must attain a degree of completeness which it was vain to hope to reach by the methods and means then in vogue. The fashion of regarding nature as though it were a living being which allowed questions as to facts to be answered by speculations as to final causes or by the desire of nature to realise beauty, must be abandoned. Enquiries into a man’s moral nature and duties must be kept apart from the simple study of his conduct in relation to natural surroundings, the disastrous effects which flow from the confusion of the two being only too apparent in the national type of the Greeks, in the exclusively political character of their morality, and in their adherence to slavery. Before this pass could be reached how much was there not to alter in the condition and mental habit of Greece! Could it indeed be expected that a more vigorous and more scientific method would gain foothold so long as the tendency to look upon the life of nature as analogous to the life of man was kept alive by a religion such as that of Hellas? Or that moral science would liberate itself from the trammels of Greek propriety of conduct, whilst in all practical matters those trammels were in full force? Or that a clearer distinction would be drawn between what comes from without and what from within in ideas—a distinction which we vainly look for in Aristotle—until a depth and an intensity had been given to the inner life, and until the rights and value of the individual as such had obtained a recognition which it required the combined influence of Christianity and the peculiar Germanic character to bring about? The more vividly the national type and the national conditions surrounding Greek philosophy are realised, the firmer becomes the conviction, that to heal its defects—which are apparent even in its greatest and most brilliant achievements—nothing short of a revolution in the whole mental tone of Greece would avail—such as history has seen accomplished, but not till after many shifts and many centuries.