In November the M.W.S. Department made an unofficial forecast of the probable rate of production. This forecast they confirmed officially on February 1. The total output of Tanks was to be roughly as follows: 1917 January 50 February 50 March 120 April 120 May 140 June 200 July 240 August 260 September 280 Of these, after March at least eighty per month were to be of the Mark IV. type, of which, with the Mark IV._a_, there was to be a total of over 1000. In August or September, a proportion of the output was to be of the greatly improved Mark V. type. Actually at the end of March only sixty Tanks could be scraped together for the Battle of Arras, and most of these were machines that had been repaired after the Somme. Not a single Mark IV. machine arrived in France until April 22, after the Battle of Arras had been fought and won, and no Mark V. machines until March 23, 1918. The entire programme was, in short, many months late. The M.W.S.D. were, however, not altogether blameable for the occasionally somewhat astonishing discrepancy between their promises and performance. It is, in fact, related for the defence that even the airy promises had their purpose--that the very discrepancies which the Fighting Side viewed aghast were deliberately created by the wily M.W.S.D. as bogies with which to scare supine manufacturers or reluctant Government Departments. “What!” the M.W.S.D. would say. “You can’t do better than that! But look what we’ve actually promised! And just see what sort of names our partners the Fighting Side are calling us already! You _must_ do better.” A duly enraged Fighting Side must have made an unsurpassable Jorkins. In any case, however, it was usually only the M.W.S.D.’s promises which could even be called in question. Considering the means at their disposal and the difficulties which surrounded them, their practical efforts were praiseworthy. Their troubles came chiefly from three sources. Some of the difficulties from each were inevitable, and some were not. First there were the physical difficulties of manufacture. The shortage both of labour and material was acute, and at the period with which we are now concerned, Tanks came low in the Ministry of Munitions’ priority list. Shells, guns, aeroplanes and even transport lorries all took precedence of Tanks. A second difficulty was the habit which the Authorities had of blowing alternately hot and cold, according as Tanks momentarily did well or ill in the field. This resulted in a tendency towards a see-saw of alternate periods of slackness and overwhelming hurry in the factories. Tradition relates that Sir Albert Stern (the Director-General of the M.W.S.D.) here played a most useful part. He used his whole influence to maintain a steady output, acting, in fact, as a kind of stabiliser.