The Theory of Moral Sentiments: Or, an Essay Towards an Analysis of the Principles by Which Men Naturally Judge Concerning the Conduct and Character, First of Their Neighbours, and Afterwards of Themselves. to Which Is Added, a Dissertation on the Origin of Languages.Smith, Adam
Philosophy
The Theory of Moral Sentiments: Or, an Essay Towards an Analysis of the Principles by Which Men Naturally Judge Concerning the Conduct and Character, First of Their Neighbours, and Afterwards of Themselves. to Which Is Added, a Dissertation on the Origin of Languages.
Smith, Adam
Ethics -- Early works to 1800; Language and languages -- Early works to 1800
I can neither support your company, nor you mine. You are
confounded at my violence and passion, and I am enraged at your cold
insensibility and want of feeling.
In all such cases, that there may be some correspondence of sentiments
between the spectator and the person principally concerned, the
spectator must, first of all, endeavour, as much as he can, to put
himself in the situation of the other, and to bring home to himself
every little circumstance of distress which can possibly occur to the
sufferer. He must adopt the whole case of his companion with all its
minutest incidents; and strive to render as perfect as possible, that
imaginary change of situation upon which his sympathy is founded.
After all this, however, the emotions of the spectator will still be
very apt to fall short of the violence of what is felt by the sufferer.
Mankind, though naturally sympathetic, never conceive, for what has
befallen another, that degree of passion which naturally animates the
person principally concerned. That imaginary change of situation, upon
which their sympathy is founded, is but momentary. The thought of their
own safety, the thought that they themselves are not really the
sufferers, continually intrudes itself upon them; and though it does not
hinder them from conceiving a passion somewhat analogous to what is felt
by the sufferer, hinders them from conceiving any thing that approaches
to the same degree of violence. The person principally concerned is
sensible of this, and, at the same time passionately desires a more
complete sympathy. He longs for that relief which nothing can afford him
but the entire concord of the affections of the spectators with his own.
To see the emotions of their hearts, in every respect, beat time to his
own, in the violent and disagreeable passions, constitutes his sole
consolation. But he can only hope to obtain this by lowering his passion
to that pitch, in which the spectators are capable of going along with
him. He must flatten, if I may be allowed to say so, the sharpness of
its natural tone, in order to reduce it to harmony and concord with the
emotions of those who are about him. What they feel, will, indeed,
always be, in some respects, different from what he feels, and
compassion can never be exactly the same with original sorrow; because
the secret consciousness that the change of situations, from which the
sympathetic sentiment arises, is but imaginary, not only lowers it in
degree, but in some measure, varies it in kind, and gives it a quite
different modification. These two sentiments, however, may, it is
evident, have such a correspondence with one another, as is sufficient
for the harmony of society. Though they will never be unisons, they may
be concords, and this is all that is wanted or required.
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