The Theory of Moral Sentiments: Or, an Essay Towards an Analysis of the Principles by Which Men Naturally Judge Concerning the Conduct and Character, First of Their Neighbours, and Afterwards of Themselves. to Which Is Added, a Dissertation on the Origin of Languages.Smith, Adam
Philosophy
The Theory of Moral Sentiments: Or, an Essay Towards an Analysis of the Principles by Which Men Naturally Judge Concerning the Conduct and Character, First of Their Neighbours, and Afterwards of Themselves. to Which Is Added, a Dissertation on the Origin of Languages.
Smith, Adam
Ethics -- Early works to 1800; Language and languages -- Early works to 1800
The little sympathy which we feel with bodily pain is the foundation of
the propriety of constancy and patience in enduring it. The man, who
under the severest tortures allows no weakness to escape him, vents no
groan, gives way to no passion which we do not entirely enter into,
commands our highest admiration. His firmness enables him to keep time
with our indifference and insensibility. We admire and entirely go along
with the magnanimous effort which he makes for this purpose. We approve
of his behaviour, and from our experience of the common weakness of
human nature, we are surprised, and wonder how he should be able to act
so as to deserve approbation. Approbation, mixed and animated by wonder
and surprise, constitutes the sentiment which is properly called
admiration, of which, applause is the natural expression, as has already
been observed.
CHAP. II.
_Of those passions which take their origin from a particular turn or
habit of the imagination._
Even of the passions derived from the imagination, those which take
their origin from a peculiar turn or habit it has acquired, though they
may be acknowledged to be perfectly natural, are, however, but little
sympathized with. The imaginations of mankind, not having acquired that
particular turn, cannot enter into them; and such passions, though they
may be allowed to be almost unavoidable in some part of life, are always
in some measure ridiculous. This is the case with that strong attachment
which naturally grows up between two persons of different sexes, who
have long fixed their thoughts upon one another. Our imagination not
having run in the same channel with that of the lover, we cannot enter
into the eagerness of his emotions. If our friend has been injured, we
readily sympathize with his resentment, and grow angry with the very
person with whom he is angry. If he has received a benefit, we readily
enter into his gratitude, and have a very high sense of the merit of his
benefactor. But if he is in love, though we may think his passion just
as reasonable as any of the kind, yet we never think ourselves bound to
conceive a passion of the same kind, and for the same person for whom he
has conceived it. The passion appears to every body, but the man who
feels it, entirely disproportioned to the value of the object; and love,
though it is pardoned in a certain age because we know it is natural, is
always laughed at, because we cannot enter into it. All serious and
strong expressions of it appear ridiculous to a third person; and though
a lover may be good company to his mistress, he is so to nobody else. He
himself is sensible of this; and as long as he continues in his sober
senses, endeavours to treat his own passion with raillery and ridicule.
It is the only style in which we care to hear of it; because it is the
only style in which we ourselves are disposed to talk of it. We grow
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account