The Theory of Moral Sentiments: Or, an Essay Towards an Analysis of the Principles by Which Men Naturally Judge Concerning the Conduct and Character, First of Their Neighbours, and Afterwards of Themselves. to Which Is Added, a Dissertation on the Origin of Languages. — John Shaqi
The Theory of Moral Sentiments: Or, an Essay Towards an Analysis of the Principles by Which Men Naturally Judge Concerning the Conduct and Character, First of Their Neighbours, and Afterwards of Themselves. to Which Is Added, a Dissertation on the Origin of Languages.Smith, Adam
Philosophy
The Theory of Moral Sentiments: Or, an Essay Towards an Analysis of the Principles by Which Men Naturally Judge Concerning the Conduct and Character, First of Their Neighbours, and Afterwards of Themselves. to Which Is Added, a Dissertation on the Origin of Languages.
Smith, Adam
Ethics -- Early works to 1800; Language and languages -- Early works to 1800
As it is a divided sympathy which renders the whole set of passions just
now mentioned, upon most occasions, so ungraceful and disagreeable; so
there is another set opposite to these, which a redoubled sympathy
renders almost always peculiarly agreeable and becoming. Generosity,
humanity, kindness, compassion, mutual friendship and esteem, all the
social and benevolent affections, when expressed in the countenance or
behaviour, even towards those who are peculiarly connected with
ourselves, please the indifferent spectator upon almost every occasion.
His sympathy with the person who feels those passions, exactly coincides
with his concern for the person who is the object of them. The interest,
which, as a man, he is obliged to take in the happiness of this last,
enlivens his fellow-feeling with the sentiments of the other, whose
emotions are employed about the same object. We have always, therefore,
the strongest disposition to sympathize with the benevolent affections.
They appear in every respect agreeable to us. We enter into the
satisfaction both of the person who feels them, and of the person who is
the object of them. For as to be the object of hatred and indignation
gives more pain than all the evils which a brave man can fear from his
enemies; so there is a satisfaction in the consciousness of being
beloved, which, to a person of delicacy and sensibility, is of more
importance to happiness than all the advantage which he can expect to
derive from it. What character is so detectable as that of one who takes
pleasure to sow dissension among friends, and to turn their most tender
love into mortal hatred? Yet wherein does the atrocity of this so much
abhorred injury consist? Is it in depriving them of the frivolous good
offices, which had their friendship continued, they might have expected
from one another? It is in depriving them of that friendship itself, in
robbing them of each others affections, from which both derived so much
satisfaction; it is in disturbing the harmony of their hearts, and
putting an end to that happy commerce which had before subsisted between
them. These affections, that harmony, this commerce, are felt, not only
by the tender and the delicate, but by the rudest vulgar of mankind, to
be of more importance to happiness than all the little services which
could be expected to flow from them.
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