The Theory of Moral Sentiments: Or, an Essay Towards an Analysis of the Principles by Which Men Naturally Judge Concerning the Conduct and Character, First of Their Neighbours, and Afterwards of Themselves. to Which Is Added, a Dissertation on the Origin of Languages. — John Shaqi
The Theory of Moral Sentiments: Or, an Essay Towards an Analysis of the Principles by Which Men Naturally Judge Concerning the Conduct and Character, First of Their Neighbours, and Afterwards of Themselves. to Which Is Added, a Dissertation on the Origin of Languages.Smith, Adam
Philosophy
The Theory of Moral Sentiments: Or, an Essay Towards an Analysis of the Principles by Which Men Naturally Judge Concerning the Conduct and Character, First of Their Neighbours, and Afterwards of Themselves. to Which Is Added, a Dissertation on the Origin of Languages.
Smith, Adam
Ethics -- Early works to 1800; Language and languages -- Early works to 1800
Pain besides, whether of mind or body, is a more pungent sensation than
pleasure, and our sympathy with pain, though it falls greatly short of
what is naturally felt by the sufferer, is generally a more lively and
distinct perception than our sympathy with pleasure, though this last
often approaches more nearly, as I shall show immediately, to the
natural vivacity of the original passion.
Over and above all this, we often struggle to keep down our sympathy
with the sorrow of others. Whenever we are not under the observation of
the sufferer, we endeavour, for our own sake, to suppress it as much as
we can, and we are not always successful. The opposition which we make
to it, and the reluctance with which we yield to it, necessarily oblige
us to take more particular notice of it. But we never have occasion to
make this opposition to our sympathy with joy. If there is any envy in
the case, we never feel the least propensity towards it; and if there is
none, we give way to it without any reluctance. On the contrary, as we
are always ashamed of our own envy, we often pretend, and sometimes
really wish to sympathize with the joy of others, when by that
disagreeable sentiment we are disqualified from doing so. We are glad,
we say, on account of our neighbour’s good fortune, when in our hearts,
perhaps, we are really sorry. We often feel a sympathy with sorrow when
we wish to be rid of it; and we often miss that with joy when we would
be glad to have it. The obvious observation, therefore, which it
naturally falls in our way to make, is that our propensity to sympathize
with sorrow must be very strong, and our inclination to sympathize with
joy very weak.
Notwithstanding this prejudice, however, I will venture to affirm, that,
when there is no envy in the case, our propensity to sympathize with joy
is much stronger than our propensity to sympathize with sorrow; and that
our fellow-feeling for the agreeable emotion approaches much more nearly
to the vivacity of what is naturally felt by the persons principally
concerned, than that which we conceive for the painful one.
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