[Sidenote: MONEY FAMINES SHOULD HENCEFORTH BE AS IMPROBABLE OF OCCURRENCE AS CORN FAMINES.] [Sidenote: ADVANTAGES DERIVED FROM OPENING UP COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE CORN-GROWING PROVINCES OF RUSSIA.] We are of opinion that the complete communication that is now established between the commercial and monetary markets of Europe will tend gradually, if not rapidly, which is very probable, to diminish the effects of what we understand by commercial crises. The opinion embodied in this sentence which was written before the American financial crisis of 1873 broke out, has been corroborated by the great assistance afforded by the Atlantic cable in mitigating the immediate effects of the first symptoms upon the public mind, and in at once confining the disorder within limits which would probably have been impossible in the absence of telegraphic communication. The main reason why we have suffered from monetary panics so severely during the first three quarters of the present century has been from the absence of rapid communication with other monetary and commercial centres, as well as from the absence of large auxiliary monetary centres holding a good average supply of cash, to be lent out on good security to the highest bidder for the time. The facilities which now exist for applying the over-plus of grain at one centre of population to satisfy the deficiency at another, has done away with famines. The late exception of Persia proves the rule. Corn is a commodity, and money is a commodity. What applies to one, as regards demand and supply, applies also to the other. A strange nervousness still exists in some quarters about the amount of the Bank reserve, fears being entertained that it will be found too small when the time of pressure comes. Persons who are so loud in their protests at reductions in the Bank rate can never have been buyers of money themselves, or, in other words, sellers of bills. To keep the value of money the smallest fraction above what is actually necessary at the time, by the capricious exercise of a brief authority, is to commit an act of unwarrantable injustice, and to rob the needy. We say if the Bank directors maintain a higher rate of discount than is necessary, they rob the needy, and compel holders of bills to pay an illegitimately high rate of discount. It is urged in defence of this nervousness, that the attractive power of a higher rate is slow, and that the till may be exhausted before the required supply arrives. As and when it may be necessary the Bank should raise or lower its rate, maintaining a reserve which is sufficient at all times if it be about one-third of the liabilities. To speculate upon the future, is to attempt to discount influences which may never be felt. To maintain for a day a higher rate than is necessary, is to tax the public for private ends, to reinstate Protection, and to disregard sound economic principles. To illustrate what we mean, take the case of bread famines.