There they remained in camp for some weeks, when the welcome order was received to embark for England. On the 10th March, the Regiment went on board a river steamer, and started on their journey down the Tigris. It was a large vessel, and with them were their old comrades of the Fourteenth Hussars. Trans-shipping at Basra to the _Etna_, and at Bombay to the _City of Sparta_, they arrived on the 29th April in the Mersey, and on the following day went ashore at Liverpool. On the 5th May they marched into the Cavalry Barracks at Aldershot, where they were to be quartered. Here this History of ‘The Thirteenth Hussars in the Great War’ naturally comes to an end, for though the war was not formally concluded, the Regiment was now in England again, and its share in the military operations was over. But so much has been written and spoken during the last few years regarding the value of Cavalry in modern war that, as remarked in the introductory chapter, it seems desirable, before leaving the subject of the services performed by the Regiment, to say a few words upon this question. It is one about which professional soldiers only can have an opinion of any value, and I therefore confine myself to quoting the opinion of professional soldiers. [Illustration: ON THE WAY HOME THE “CITY OF SPARTA” PASSING A JAPANESE DESTROYER IN THE SUEZ CANAL] The authorities whose views have been most definitely stated are Lord Haig, Lord Allenby, and the two Generals who commanded in Mesopotamia, Maude and Marshall.[61] The last two have been already quoted as to the Cavalry work in the advance to Baghdad, and beyond. General Allenby has written as follows regarding the operations in Palestine:-- “The Desert Mounted Corps took some 46,000 prisoners during the operations. The complete destruction of the VIIth and VIIIth Turkish armies depended mainly on the rapidity with which their communications were reached, and on quick decision in dealing with the enemy’s columns as they attempted to escape. The vigorous handling of the Cavalry by its leaders, and the rapidity of its movement, overcame all attempts to delay its progress. The enemy’s columns, after they had out-distanced the pursuing Infantry, were given no time to reorganise and fight their way through.” Of course, the Cavalry did not effect their work alone. General Allenby says that the breaking of the enemy’s entrenched lines by the Infantry enabled the Cavalry to accomplish its mission. But this is no detraction from the merit of either. Both arms did their duty, and the result, in Palestine as in Mesopotamia, was what Henderson calls the most important operation of grand tactics--the surrounding and destruction of an enemy’s army.