Morality is a metaphysical quality by the help of which our practical actions are justified, and which in most cases constitutes restraint. Morality is a science, say some; morality is an art, say others; for many idealists it remains a _revanche_ of reason, and M. Rodrigues sees in it the will which binds itself and which we bind. “Individual liberty,” he says, “if it exists, only plays a part on the second plane; in practice it signifies little when humanity in its entirety is considered. Bound to an organism, and still more to society, the psychological or moral consciousness, when it draws inspiration from within itself, finds there in effect what its _milieu_ has placed there. It expresses a system of representations, to the forming of which it has in itself contributed but a small part.... Morality, too, has undergone an evolution parallel in all points to that of science.” Yes, truly, morality, like everything which touches on conduct, social laws, rites, traditions, ancestral prejudices, the need of freedom, the right of the individual, undergoes continual evolution according to the conditions of a community. We are to-day far from the morality which, according to Kant, is legislation on the part of the reasonable being, enjoining upon all persons the same duties. According to the morality of Epictetus, resting on the idea of liberty, “man may free himself of all dependence with regard to other men and to Nature, and raise himself to absolute freedom, distinguishing between the things which rest on him and those which do not, and despising the latter as immaterial”; according to the ethics of Epicurus, pleasure is the sovereign good of man, and all our efforts should tend towards its attainment, provided that pleasure consist as much of the satisfaction of the heart and mind as of the senses, but modern morality has become sectarian, and differs according to class. The principle of _bourgeois_ morality is to preserve the unity of the community without any consideration for the liberty of the individual; the _bourgeois_ family being a sort of commercial association, it confines its morality to the idea of a duty which is, above all, the protection of the interests of the community. It is a morality which is quite beside the point, and which has no intrinsic value. The principle of aristocratic morality is to preserve for the glory of its escutcheon all the splendour it deems requisite. It does not trouble itself as to the means by which that escutcheon gains in radiance, because it has made a virtue of its pride. The superadded adornments trouble it with no pangs of conscience, because for it duty consists in the integrity of appearances. This morality is not, in the main, more false in conception than that of the _bourgeois_; it is the guardian of appanage as the other is the guardian of selfish interests.