De tribus impostoribus; Rationalism; Spinoza, Benedictus de, 1632-1677
It must be agreed that all men are in a state of profound ignorance
at their birth, and that their only natural wish is to seek that
which is pleasant and profitable to them.--Hence it follows, 1st,
That they believe it sufficient for them that they are free, and
that they feel within themselves the power of volition and desire,
without troubling themselves as to the causes which effect this
volition and this desire; because they know them not. 2dly, As men
only aim at one object when they prefer it to all others, they sought
to ascertain the final causes of their actions, imagining that after
these were discovered there would be little room for doubt; and as
they found within themselves and without themselves abundant means
of arriving at the end proposed--the eye constructed for vision, the
ear for hearing; a sun above them to give them light and heat; they
concluded that there was nothing in nature which was not made for them
and which they could not enjoy and dispose of; but as they well knew
that they were not the creators of these things, they thought that
they were justified in imagining a Supreme Being, the author of all;
in one word they conceived that everything in existence was the work of
one, or of more Divinities. On the other hand, the nature of the Gods
whom men acknowledged being unknown to them, they believed that they
were susceptible of like passions with themselves; and as the natural
dispositions of men are different, every one rendered to his Divinity
a worship according to his fancy, with the view of drawing down his
blessings, and making universal nature subservient to his own desires.
§ 4.
In this manner prejudice was changed into superstition. It was rooted
in such a way that the most ignorant people believed themselves
capable of explaining the doctrine of final causes, as if they had
an entire knowledge of them.--Thus, instead of proving that Nature
did nothing in vain, they imagined that God and Nature thought after
the manner of men. Experience taught them that an infinite number
of calamities disturbed the pleasures of life--storms, earthquakes,
plagues, hunger, thirst, &c. They attributed all these evils to
divine wrath, and believed that the Deity was irritated against
mankind for their offences; nor could the daily occurring examples
which prove that good and evil happen alike to the just and unjust,
disabuse them of their prejudices. This error prevailed, because they
found it easier to remain in their natural ignorance, than to divest
themselves of notions established for so many ages; and to adopt
something in their stead, having at least the appearance of truth.
§ 5.
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