The two crimes were the same. M. Mathieu Dreyfus had denounced Major Esterhazy. If Major Esterhazy had been condemned, the setting aside of the verdict against Captain Dreyfus would have followed as a matter of necessity. Major Esterhazy was acquitted. The question remains open, and we are to deal with it. The question takes the form of a dilemma. Either we are to be prevented from offering any proof, and in that case we shall see; or, on the contrary, we are to be permitted to examine the situation of Captain Dreyfus as well as that of Major Esterhazy, since both are closely connected, and it would not be possible for us to prove here the guilt of Major Esterhazy and his acquittal in obedience to orders, if we had not the right to prove at the same time the innocence of Captain Dreyfus. To say nothing of the fact, gentlemen, that the minister of war, in drawing up his complaint, perhaps not perceiving this dangerous detail, allowed a little paragraph to slip in, in which it was said that the second council of war covered the illegality to which the first had committed itself. Now, gentlemen, how are we to demonstrate that they have covered an illegality, unless we are allowed to demonstrate first that an illegality has been committed? Unless, indeed, they mean--and I confess that that would seem to me a really curious preliminary to this discussion--to acknowledge that the illegality has been committed, and that it is recognized in the face of France and the civilized world. If not, then on this point as on others we must be permitted the opportunity of proof. You know, gentlemen, what the authorities say. It is a matter of doctrine and of law that, outside of the matters set forth in the summons, it is permissible to prove matters connected with them by close and indivisible ties. I have shown you that the matters which it is our right to prove are closely bound up with the other matters of which we likewise offer proof. It remains only to say a single word in answer to a last objection of the attorney-general,--the thing judged. The thing judged! What will be left of it, gentlemen, if we succeed in showing that it has been irregularly and illegally judged, this thing, in which public opinion has such faith that it considers as public malefactors those who dream for a second of doubting it, even though they have declared that they are ready to furnish the proof? Citizens respect this thing judged. It is their right and their duty to respect it. But only, I repeat, because they believe it to have been regularly and legally judged. Where there is no right, there is no legality, no justice, no thing judged, Mr. Attorney-General, and let us say no more of exceptions.” In reinforcement of the position of M. Labori, M. Albert Clemenceau then addressed the court: