offence here, and publication of the same libel here. Let us then examine how far these alleged libels, which, although not subjects of criminal prosecution here, can be made use of to sustain the publication, or prove, or aid in proving, the criminal intent or malice in the publication of another libel charged in the first count, and of the publication of which some evidence has been offered to the jury. Now the libels in the first count, of which evidence of publication has been given to the jury, is of itself libellous, or it is not; if it be libellous and published, the law deduces the criminal intent from the libellous matter itself, and therefore requires no aid from other libellous writings to sustain it: if it be not libellous, it cannot be made so by showing other libellous writings of the traverser, of which he is not accused or charged in the indictment. I mean the libellous matter itself in the libel is, in the eye of the law, proof of criminal intent, if it be published, unless the traverser can rebut this inference of law by proving his innocence of any criminal intent, by some sufficient excuse, as that some person stole the copy from him and published it without his knowledge or consent. But the Attorney for the United States urged that these pamphlets, indicating the one charged in the first count, contained or expressed opinions which coincided with his sentiments on the subject matter of them; and this was urged as a reason for admitting them in evidence. This, in my view, amounts to nothing more than that he appropriated to himself and adopted the thoughts of others. What proof could this appropriation or adoption afford of a malicious intent in their publication? Every man has an unquestionable right to his own moral or religious sentiments: there is no crime in this: it would be criminal to restrain any man in this country in his own, or in adopting the moral or religious opinions of others, if he please; it is criminal only when he attempts to propagate them, and only when they have a tendency to disturb the peace of society--to invade the general rights of property--and are most essentially criminal, if they have a tendency to produce the dreadful results charged in the indictment. But bad as the tendency of those writings may be, and unquestionably are, if truly portrayed in the indictment, I know not how much less danger would result, if, led away by our feelings, we bend the rules and principles of law from expediency, or the supposed political necessity of convicting the accused. The present crisis may pass without leaving any dangerous consequences behind it. The good sense and virtue of the people, and the fear of punishment in transgressors, will check the progress of these alarming doctrines; but if we invade the panoply which the law has provided for the protection of the accused against arbitrary or vindictive judgments, we establish precedents, the evil consequences of which cannot be calculated. The