criminal intent, then, does not consist in the writing or possession of a written or printed libel, but in the publishing it. It is not easy to conceive how the criminal intent of publishing one libel, can be proved by the having in possession other libels not published, any more than you would be permitted to prove a man guilty of stealing one horse, because you might prove that he had a propensity to horse-stealing. But you would not be allowed to introduce such proof. The _quo animo_ with which a horse is taken, is as necessary in an indictment for horse stealing, as for publishing a libel. Now, as I observed before, if the matter of the pamphlet charged in the first count in the indictment is libellous, does not the acknowledgment of the traverser that the sentiment in the several pamphlets coincided with his own, embrace in it the sentiments in the pamphlets charged in the first count, and of which evidence has been offered of publication? If so, does not this libel of itself afford sufficient evidence of malice, without resorting to the matter of other pamphlets not charged? Then why resort to them? The traverser was not apprised from this first count, that he was responsible for any libel or libellous matter, except what was contained in the libel set out in said count. If you are permitted in order to prove malice in publishing the libel in the first count, to read to the jury the libellous matter of other alleged libels, what will be the consequence? The matter in those other libels may be of a more aggravated or inflammatory character than in that set out in the first count. Is it not evident, if such be the case, that the jury may be influenced to convict the traverser, not by the matter of the libel with which he is charged, but from that of other libels with which he is not charged? Surely, if malice in the publication of a libel be an inference of law, that inference must be drawn only from the libel charged and published, not from other writings which are not libellous because not published. As I observed before, if the paper charged in the first count be of itself libellous, the criminal intent of publication is to be inferred from the confession of the traverser that he approved of the sentiments contained in it. If such inference can be drawn from such confession it can as well be sustained from the matter of this libel, as from that of any number of others, and there is no need to resort to them for such inference; if the matter of such papers be not libellous, no number of other libels found in the traverser's possession, however coinciding with his own opinions, can sustain the libel charged.