On the other hand, it did not seem unlikely that M. Venizelos, who was being expected in London, might have seen the mistake the Supreme Council had made when it had granted the Greek claims so fully, and that the apprehension he was entitled to feel about the reality of the huge advantages obtained by Greece might have a salutary influence on him. Yet nothing of the kind happened, and in a long letter to the _Daily Telegraph_ (June 18) he asserted not only the rights of Greece to Smyrna, but his determination to have them respected and to prevent the revision of the treaty. M. Venizelos, “the great victor of the war in the East,” as he was called in London, even supported his claims by drawing public attention to the intrigues carried on by Constantine’s supporters to restore him to the throne. He maintained that the revision of the treaty would second the efforts which were then being made in Athens by the old party of the Crown, which, he said, was bound to triumph if Greece was deprived of the fruits of her victory and if the Allies did not redeem their pledges towards her. But then it became obvious that the Greeks did not despise Constantine so much after all, and their present attitude could not in any way be looked upon as disinterested. It might have been expected, on the other hand, that Count Sforza, who had been High Commissioner in Constantinople, where he had won warm sympathies, would maintain the friendly policy pursued by Italy since the armistice towards Turkey—that is to say, he would urge that the time had come to revise the treaty of peace with Turkey which, since it had been drawn up at San Remo, had constantly been opposed by the Italian Press. All the parties shared this view, even the clerical party, and one of its members in the Chamber, M. Vassalo, who had just come back from Turkey, energetically maintained it was impossible to suppress the Ottoman Empire without setting on fire the whole of Asia. The Congress of the Popular Party in Naples held the same opinion. Recent events also induced Italy to preserve the cautious attitude she had assumed in Eastern affairs since the armistice, and she naturally aimed at counterbalancing the supremacy that England, if she once ruled over Constantinople and controlled Greater Greece, would enjoy over not only the western part, but the whole, of the Mediterranean Sea.