“Secondly, the Commission of the Straits. “Thirdly, the military powers of occupation. “Fourthly, the diplomatic representatives of France, Britain, and Italy, deliberating in a kind of council with the military and naval commanders of the Franco-Anglo-Italian forces.” With them would be— “Fifthly, the Inter-Allied Commissioners of Control and Military Organisation. “Sixthly, the Commission of Finance. “Seventhly, the Council of the Ottoman Public Debt. “Eighthly, the consuls’ jurisdictions.” After going over all the objections raised by the coexistence of these various bodies, whose powers would encroach upon each other or would be exactly similar, and the impossibility that foreign agents accredited to the Sultan should hold such functions, the memorandum opposed the following reasons to the decisions of the Conference: “First, the draft of the treaty does not in any way institute _an international judicial and political organisation_ of the Straits. “Secondly, it institutes a political and military power on behalf of _some_ States, attended with all the international risks pertaining to it. “Thirdly, with regard to Turkey it would constitute _a direct and deep infringement on her rights of sovereignty, preservation, and security, which infringements are not necessary to safeguard the freedom of passage_ of the Straits. “Fourthly, from an international point of view the intended régime would create a kind of _international moral person by the side of the States, which would not represent the League of Nations_. “Fifthly, the new international condition of Turkey would in some respects be inferior to that of the new States consisting of territories detached from Turkey, for these new States would be placed under the mandate of a Power _appointed by the League of Nations_ mainly in accordance with _the wishes of the populations concerned_, and bound to give a periodical account to the League of Nations of the exercise of its mandate. “Sixthly, far from ensuring the internationalisation of the Straits, which was aimed at by the Powers, the régime instituted by the draft of the treaty would _favour their nationalisation by another State_. “The internationalisation of the Straits could only be realised by means of an international organisation—viz., _a judicial organisation representing all the Powers_.” Therefore, the Government allows the free passage of the Straits, but asks that they should be controlled only by the League of Nations, and that the Straits zones mentioned in the scheme of internationalisation “should be reduced territorially to what is necessary to guarantee the free passage of the Straits.” Turkey declares herself ready to accept “this scheme, if restricted to the Straits zone, whose frontiers were fixed as follows”: “(_a_) In Europe the Sharkeui-Karachali line, thus including all the Gallipoli Peninsula.