Finally, the following letter of M. Koudashev to M. Sazonov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, printed in the collection of secret documents of the Russian Foreign Office published in December, 1917,[57] shows how deeply the leaders of Russia and the Russian people had this question at heart, that it commanded all their foreign policy, and that they were determined to use any means, to resort to any artifice, in order to solve it in conformity with their wishes. No wonder, then, as we pointed out at the beginning of this book, that Turkey, being fully aware of the Russian enmity, should have consented to stand by the side of Germany in a war in which her very existence was at stake. IMPERIAL HEADQUARTERS, _February_ 5, 1916 (o.s.). “Most honoured Serguey Dmitrievich,—At the request of General Alexiev, I waited on him to discuss how the capture of Erzerum could be best exploited. “Such an event obviously points to a certain state of mind in Turkey which we should turn to account. If a separate peace with Turkey was to be contemplated, it should be borne in mind that such favourable circumstances are not likely to occur again within a long time. It would undoubtedly be our advantage to start the negotiations after a victory which the enemy rightly or wrongly fears will be attended with a new catastrophe. “Considering that our forces on the secondary front of Caucasus are insignificant and it is impossible to take away one soldier from the chief centre of operations, it would be most difficult, in General Alexiev’s opinion, to derive full profit from the glorious success of our Caucasian army in a strictly military sense. “Though he does not wish to advocate an immediate peace with Turkey, the general desires me to bring to your knowledge some of his views concerning this eventuality that the situation created by our recent success may be carefully considered and fully utilised. “According to him, it would be most important to specify the war aims of Russia. Though the brigadier-general is fully aware this is a question to be settled by the Government, yet he thinks his opinion might be of some weight. “In the course of our conversation, we have come to the following conclusions: “Whatever may have been our prospects at the time when Turkey entered into the war, of securing compensations at the cost of the latter country when peace is concluded, we must own that our expectations will not be fulfilled during the present war. The longer the war lasts, the more difficult it will be for us to secure the possession of the Straits. General Alexiev and General Danilov agree on this point. I refer you to my letters of December, 1914, and January, 1915, as to Danilov’s opinion.