The United Empire Loyalists: A Chronicle of the Great Migration [1920 ed.] — John Shaqi
The United Empire Loyalists: A Chronicle of the Great Migration [1920 ed.]Wallace, W. Stewart (William Stewart)
History
The United Empire Loyalists: A Chronicle of the Great Migration [1920 ed.]
Wallace, W. Stewart (William Stewart)
American loyalists; United Empire loyalists
It has been charged against the Loyalists, and the charge cannot be
denied, that at the beginning of the Revolution they lacked initiative,
and were slow to organize and defend themselves. It was not, in fact,
until 1776 that Loyalist regiments began to be formed on an extensive
scale. There were several reasons why this was so. In the first place a
great many of the Loyalists, as has been pointed out, were not at the
outset in complete sympathy with the policy of the British government;
and those who might have been willing to take up arms were very early
disarmed and intimidated by the energy of the revolutionary authorities.
In the second place that very conservatism which made the Loyalists draw
back from revolution hindered them from taking arms until the king gave
them commissions and provided facilities for military organization. And
there is no fact better attested in the history of the Revolution than
the failure of the British authorities to understand until it was too
late the great advantages to be derived from the employment of Loyalist
levies. The truth is that the British officers did not think much more
highly of the Loyalists than they did of the rebels. For both they had
the Briton’s contempt for the colonial, and the professional soldier’s
contempt for the armed civilian.
Had more use been made of the Tories, the military history of the
Revolution might have been very different. They understood the conditions
of warfare in the New World much better than the British regulars or the
German mercenaries. Had the advice of prominent Loyalists been accepted
by the British commander at the battle of Bunker’s Hill, it is highly
probable that there would have been none of that carnage in the British
ranks which made of the victory a virtual defeat. It was said that
Burgoyne’s early successes were largely due to the skill with which he
used his Loyalist auxiliaries. And in the latter part of the war, it must
be confessed that the successes of the Loyalist troops far outshone those
of the British regulars. In the Carolinas Tarleton’s Loyal Cavalry swept
everything before them, until their defeat at the Cowpens by Daniel
Morgan. In southern New York Governor Tryon’s levies carried fire and
sword up the Hudson, into ‘Indigo Connecticut,’ and over into New Jersey.
Along the northern frontier, the Loyalist forces commanded by Sir John
Johnson and Colonel Butler made repeated incursions into the Mohawk,
Schoharie, and Wyoming valleys and, in each case, after leaving a trail
of desolation behind them, they withdrew to the Canadian border in good
order. The trouble was that, owing to the stupidity and incapacity of
Lord George Germain, the British minister who was more than any other man
responsible for the misconduct of the American War, these expeditions
were not made part of a properly concerted plan; and so they sank into
the category of isolated raids.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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