Adhik. XI (17) teaches that the individual soul is, according to Scripture, permanent, eternal, and therefore not, like the ether and the other elements, produced from Brahman at the time of creation.--This Sutra is of course commented on in a very different manner by /S/a@nkara on the one hand and Ramanuja on the other. According to the former, the jiva is in reality identical--and as such co-eternal--with Brahman; what originates is merely the soul's connexion with its limiting adjuncts, and that connexion is moreover illusory.--According to Ramanuja, the jiva is indeed an effect of Brahman, but has existed in Brahman from all eternity as an individual being and as a mode (prakara) of Brahman. So indeed have also the material elements; yet there is an important distinction owing to which the elements may be said to originate at the time of creation, while the same cannot be said of the soul. Previously to creation the material elements exist in a subtle condition in which they possess none of the qualities that later on render them the objects of ordinary experience; hence, when passing over into the gross state at the time of creation, they may be said to originate. The souls, on the other hand, possess at all times the same essential qualities, i.e. they are cognizing agents; only, whenever a new creation takes place, they associate themselves with bodies, and their intelligence therewith undergoes a certain expansion or development (vikasa); contrasting with the unevolved or contracted state (sanko/k/a) which characterised it during the preceding pralaya. But this change is not a change of essential nature (svarupanyathabhava) and hence we have to distinguish the souls as permanent entities from the material elements which at the time of each creation and reabsorption change their essential characteristics. Adhik. XII (18) defines the nature of the individual soul. The Sutra declares that the soul is 'j/n/a.' This means, according to /S/a@nkara, that intelligence or knowledge does not, as the Vai/s/eshikas teach, constitute a mere attribute of the soul which in itself is essentially non-intelligent, but is the very essence of the soul. The soul is not a knower, but knowledge; not intelligent, but intelligence.--Ramanuja, on the other hand, explains 'j/n/a' by 'j/n/at/ri/,' i.e. knower, knowing agent, and considers the Sutra to be directed not only against the Vai/s/eshikas, but also against those philosophers who--like the Sa@nkhyas and the Vedantins of /S/a@nkara's school--maintain that the soul is not a knowing agent, but pure /k/aitanya.--The wording of the Sutra certainly seems to favour Ramanuja's interpretation; we can hardly imagine that an author definitely holding the views of /S/a@nkara should, when propounding the important dogma of the soul's nature, use the term j/n/a of which the most obvious interpretation j/n/at/ri/, not j/n/anam.