Adhik. XIII (19-32) treats the question whether the individual soul is a/n/u, i.e. of very minute size, or omnipresent, all-pervading (sarvagata, vyapin). Here, again, we meet with diametrically opposite views.--In /S/a@nkara's opinion the Sutras 19-38 represent the purvapaksha view, according to which the jiva is a/n/u, while Sutra 29 formulates the siddhanta, viz. that the jiva, which in reality is all-pervading, is spoken of as a/n/u in some scriptural passages, because the qualities of the internal organ--which itself is a/n/u--constitute the essence of the individual soul as long as the latter is implicated in the sa/m/sara.--According to Ramanuja, on the other hand, the first Sutra of the adhikara/n/a gives utterance to the siddhanta view, according to which the soul is of minute size; the Sutras 20-25 confirm this view and refute objections raised against it; while the Sutras 26-29 resume the question already mooted under Sutra 18, viz. in what relation the soul as knowing agent (j/n/at/ri/) stands to knowledge (j/n/ana).--In order to decide between the conflicting claims of these two interpretations we must enter into some details.--/S/a@nkara maintains that Sutras 19-28 state and enforce a purvapaksha view, which is finally refuted in 29. What here strikes us at the outset, is the unusual length to which the defence of a mere prima facie view is carried; in no other place the Sutras take so much trouble to render plausible what is meant to be rejected in the end, and an unbiassed reader will certainly feel inclined to think that in 19-28 we have to do, not with the preliminary statement of a view finally to be abandoned, but with an elaborate bona fide attempt to establish and vindicate an essential dogma of the system. Still it is not altogether impossible that the purvapaksha should here be treated at greater length than usual, and the decisive point is therefore whether we can, with /S/a@nkara, look upon Sutra 29 as embodying a refutation of the purvapaksha and thus implicitly acknowledging the doctrine that the individual soul is all-pervading. Now I think there can be no doubt that /S/a@nkara's interpretation of the Sutra is exceedingly forced. Literally translated (and leaving out the non-essential word 'praj/n/avat') the Sutra runs as follows: 'But on account of that quality (or "those qualities;" or else "on account of the quality--or qualities--of that") being the essence, (there is) that designation (or "the designation of that").' This /S/a@nkara maintains to mean, 'Because the qualities of the buddhi are the essence of the soul in the sa/m/sara state, therefore the soul itself is sometimes spoken of as a/n/u.' Now, in the first place, nothing in the context warrants the explanation of the first 'tat' by buddhi. And--which is more important--in the second place, it is more than doubtful whether on /S/a@nkara's own system the qualities of the buddhi--such as pleasure, pain, desire, aversion,