On the evening of the 10th the French governor assembled his superior officers, communicated Massena’s instructions, and then issued his own. The soldiers were ordered to quit the town at ten o’clock--march in profound silence--and no matter what circumstances should occur, they were directed to receive the fire of the besiegers without returning a shot. By daylight Brennier calculated that they should have reached the bridge--but if delayed by accident, or attacked in force, the way was to be opened with the bayonet. The night march was pointed out from the ramparts--and at eleven o’clock, under cover of an immense explosion, the brave band left the ruined fortress, and guided by the stars, pushed boldly for the French lines. The springing of the mines was not particularly attended to--for on the preceding nights similar explosions had been heard. But suddenly a report was spread that Almeida was deserted--and that the garrison, with Brennier at their head, were marching rapidly on Barba del Puerco. The pickets of Pack’s brigade were at Malpartada; and that general, in visiting his outposts, first ascertained the escape of the French, and gave an alarm. It was now too late--the first picket that opposed the garrison of Almeida had been bayoneted--and pushing through the others, who could offer but trifling opposition, Brennier marched rapidly on. Pack sent immediately to apprise Campbell of the occurrence, and in person he hung on the enemy’s rear, indicating the line of the retreat by the flashes of his musketry, which were constantly kept up. Campbell, though he hurried to the point, appears to have issued no distinct orders, which should have produced an instant pursuit. The 4th regiment endeavoured to head the retreating column--but the latter marched too rapidly to be overtaken. Brennier’s orders were strictly obeyed--the column hurried on--and not a shot was fired until it reached the Aqueda. There the French halted for their stragglers to come up, for they had also diverged a little to the left of the proper route. These delays enabled the 2nd, 4th, and 36th, who had thrown aside their knapsacks, to overtake them in the act of crossing the bridge at Puerco. In passing they were exposed to a heavy fire, by which they lost one hundred men--while some squadrons of the Royals, and Pack’s Portuguese light troops, captured ten officers and upwards of two hundred men. The retreat of the garrison from Almeida was admirably planned and bravely executed. Three-fourths of the number were thus saved--and the doubt is, whether Massena’s astonishment or Wellington’s annoyance at Brennier’s escape, was the greater. Indeed, fewer prosperous results succeeded the battle of Fuentes d’Onoro than might have been reasonably looked for. But such events are ever occurring, and form the proverbial uncertainty of _la fortune de la guerre_.