_The dangerous distinction between "theoretical" and "practical"_ in Kant for instance, but also in the ancient philosophers:--they behave as if pure intellectuality presented them with the problems of science and metaphysics;--they behave as if practice should be judged by a measure of its own, whatever the judgment of theory may be. Against the first tendency I set up my _psychology of philosophers_: their strangest calculations and "intellectuality" are still but the last pallid impress of a physiological fact; spontaneity is absolutely lacking in them, everything is instinct, everything is intended to follow a certain direction from the first.... Against the second tendency I put my question: whether we know another method of acting correctly, besides that of thinking correctly; the last case _is_ action, the first presupposes thought Are we possessed of a means whereby we can judge of the value of a method of life differently from the value of a theory: through induction or comparison?... Guileless people imagine that in this respect we are better equipped, we know what is "good"--and the philosophers are content to repeat this view. We conclude that some sort of _faith_ is at work in this matter, and nothing more.... "Men must act; _consequently_ rules of conduct are necessary"--this is what even the ancient Sceptics thought. The _urgent need_ of a definite decision in this department of knowledge is used as an argument in favour of regarding something as _true_!... "Men must not act"--said their more consistent brothers, the Buddhists, and then thought out a mode of conduct which would deliver man from the yoke of action.... To adapt one's self, to live as the "_common man_" lives, and to regard as right and proper what _he_ regards as right: this is _submission_ to the _gregarious instinct._ One must carry one's courage and severity so far as to learn to consider such submission a _disgrace._ One should not live according to two standards!... One should not separate theory and practice!... 459. Of all that which was formerly held to be true, not one word is to be credited. Everything which was formerly disdained as unholy, forbidden, contemptible, and fatal--all these flowers now bloom on the most charming paths of truth. The whole of this old morality concerns us no longer: it contains not one idea which is still worthy of respect. We have outlived it--we are no longer sufficiently coarse and guileless to be forced to allow ourselves to be lied to in this way.... In more polite language: we are too virtuous for it.... And if truth in the old sense were "true" only because the old morality said "yea" to it, and _had a right_ to say "yea" to it: it follows that no truth of the past can any longer be of use to us.... Our _criterion_ of truth is /certainly not morality: we _refute_ an assertion when we show that it is dependent upon morality and is inspired by noble feelings. 460.