The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4: Philosophical Works, 1705-21Berkeley, George
Philosophy
The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4: Philosophical Works, 1705-21
Berkeley, George
Philosophy -- Early works to 1800
Extension thought peculiarly inert, because not accompany’d wth pleasure &
pain: hence thought to exist in matter; as also for that it was conceiv’d
common to 2 senses, [as also the constant perception of ’em].
Blind at 1st sight could not tell how near what he saw was to him, nor
even whether it be wthout him or in his eye(205). Qu. Would he not think
the later?
Blind at 1st sight could not know yt wt he saw was extended, until he had
seen and touched some one self-same thing—not knowing how _minimum
tangibile_ would look in vision.
(M345) Mem. That homogeneous particles be brought in to answer the
objection of God’s creating sun, plants, &c. before animals.
In every bodie two infinite series of extension—the one of tangible, the
other of visible.
All things to a blind [man] at first seen in a point.
Ignorance of glasses made men think extension to be in bodies.
(M346) Homogeneous portions of matter—useful to contemplate them.
Extension if in matter changes its relation wth _minimum visibile_, wch
seems to be fixt.
Qu. whether m.v. be fix’d?
(M347) Each particle of matter if extended must be infinitely extended, or
have an infinite series of extension.
(M348) If the world be granted to consist of Matter, ’tis the mind gives
it beauty and proportion.
Wt I have said onely proves there is no proportion at all times and in all
men between a visible & tangible inch.
Tangible and visible extension heterogeneous, because they have no common
measure; also because their simplest constituent parts or elements are
specifically different, viz. _punctum visibile & tangibile_. N. B. The
former seems to be no good reason.
(M349) By immateriality is solv’d the cohesion of bodies, or rather the
dispute ceases.
Our idea we call extension neither way capable of infinity, i.e. neither
infinitely small or great.
Greatest possible extension seen under an angle wch will be less than 180
degrees, the legs of wch angle proceed from the ends of the extension.
(M350) Allowing there be extended, solid, &c. substances without the mind,
’tis impossible the mind should know or perceive them; the mind, even
according to the materialists, perceiving onely the impressions made upon
its brain, or rather the ideas attending these impressions(206).
Unity _in abstracto_ not at all divisible, it being as it were a point, or
with Barrow nothing at all; _in concreto_ not divisible _ad infinitum_,
there being no one idea demonstrable _ad infinitum_.
(M351) Any subject can have of each sort of primary qualities but one
particular at once. Locke, b. 4. c. 3. s. 15.
Qu. whether we have clear ideas of large numbers themselves, or onely of
their relations?
(M352) Of solidity see L. b. 2. c. 4. s. 1, 5, 6. If any one ask wt
solidity is, let him put a flint between his hands and he will know.
Extension of body is continuity of solid, &c.; extension of space is
continuity of unsolid, &c.
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